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BEYOND THE NUMBERS: SUBSTANTIVE GENDER  
DIVERSITY IN BOARDROOMS 
YARON NILI* 
The push for gender diversity on public companies’ boards has been gaining 
traction. Advocacy groups, institutional investors, regulators, and companies 
themselves have all recognized the need for more diverse boards. However, gender 
parity is still absent from most public companies’ boards, and a significant number 
of companies still have no women on their boards. 
Current public and academic discourse has focused on the number of women 
serving on the board and their percentage compared to men as the litmus test for 
gender diversity. However, academic studies and the public push for more diversity 
have mostly failed to account for another important measure of board gender 
diversity—the actual role and clout that female directors have within the boardroom. 
This is what the Article terms as substantive gender diversity.  
Substantive gender diversity matters. It is at the core of both the social cause and 
the business case for gender diversity on boards. This Article explores this 
substantive component of board gender diversity through empirical data relating to 
the roles that men and women play on corporate boards. The Article finds 
statistically significant differences between the roles of female and male directors. 
Building on these findings, the Article asserts that regulators, investors, and 
companies must focus not only on increasing the number of women on boards but 
also on ensuring that female directors enjoy similar parity once elected. The Article 
then proposes a shift towards a Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure regime 
which would measure and report the substantive aspect of gender diversity in 
boardrooms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
She appeared in the middle of the night on the eve of International Women’s Day 
2017.1 Staring defiantly at one of the most iconic symbols of corporate America in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Stares Down Wall Street’s Bull, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017, 
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Manhattan, the Fearless Girl statue by Kristen Visbal is a symbol of the increased 
attention by investors and the public to the lack of gender diversity within corporate 
boardrooms in the United States.2 Though the statue’s location was temporary,3 State 
Street Global Advisors, who commissioned the statue, took a more long-lasting step 
towards promoting board diversity by voting against 400 corporate boards with no 
female directors.4 While the $2.47 trillion asset manager will not require a female 
director quota, companies must now show concrete attempts to remedy their 
nominating procedures to encourage female nominees in order to avoid a negative 
vote.5 This resolute act mirrors what has steadily become a new focus for boardrooms 
and investors: gender diversity. 
Calls for increased gender diversity in boardrooms are not new,6 but the effort to 
achieve better gender parity has come to the forefront of corporate governance 
discourse in recent years. On the heels of mandatory quotas for female directors in 
many European countries,7 and with increasing evidence suggesting that boardroom 
diversity increases company performance,8 the push for diversity has gained traction 
                                                                                                                 
 
11:07 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/nation/2017/03/08/fearless-girl-wall 
-street/98898896 [https://perma.cc/MWM8-7AAC].  
 2.  Peter A. Szekely, On Women’s Day Eve, Statute of Girl Stares Down Wall Street 
Bull, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-womens-day-usa 
-idUSKBN16E2M8 [https://perma.cc/6DUE-V9S4]. 
 3. Beth Healy, State Street Global Advisors Presses Companies It Invests in to Add 
Women to Boards, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com 
/business/2017/03/07/state-street-global-advisors-presses-companies-invests-add-women-
boards/cE1LWXt6tK7DfveYnIFmpJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/6DUE-V9S4]; Liz Moyer, 
‘Fearless Girl’ Will Be Moving to NYSE After Spending a Year Staring Down ‘Charging Bull’, 
CNBC (Apr. 19, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/19/fearless-girl-moving 
-to-nyse-after-spending-a-year-staring-down-charging-bull.html [https://perma.cc/AW9C 
-AR6R]. 
 4. Justin Baer, State Street Votes Against 400 Companies Citing Gender Diversity, 
WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2017, 8:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/state-street-votes 
-against-400-companies-citing-gender-diversity-1501029490 [https://perma.cc/E2F9-AP6P]. 
 5. Joann S. Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against Companies that 
Don’t Have Women Directors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/state-street-says-it-will-start-voting-against-companies-that-dont-have-women 
-directors-1488862863 [https://perma.cc/G2UV-M6W8]. 
 6. See, e.g., ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (2d ed. 
1993); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios 
and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966 (1977) (arguing in 1977 for critical 
mass theory and the need for boards to have at least thirty-five percent of directors be female 
to introduce new perspectives and increase corporate performance). 
 7. Douglas M. Branson, Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors–
A Global Snapshot, 37 J. CORP. L. 793, 803 (2012); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENDER 
BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS: EUROPE IS CRACKING THE GLASS CEILING (Mar. 2014), 
https://www.genderportal.eu/sites/default/files/resource_pool/FS-WOB-FINAL-EN 
-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DPD-YXQ9]. 
 8. LOIS JOY, NANCY M. CARTER, HARVEY M. WAGNER & SRIRAM NARAYANAN, 
CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION 
ON BOARDS (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Bottom_Line_Corporate 
_Performance_and_Womens_Representation_on_Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/45NP-WQDP]. 
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within the investor community.9 In addition to State Street, Vanguard and BlackRock 
have also taken public steps to promote and advocate for greater board diversity.10 
Even more recently, the New York City Comptroller and the New York City Pension 
Funds launched their own initiative focusing on board diversity disclosure,11 and 
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) and Glass Lewis, the two largest and 
most influential proxy advisory firms, have announced a new focus on gender 
diversity.12 
Congress is also becoming more involved in the efforts to improve board 
diversity. In May 2017, Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney and Donald S. Beyer 
sent a letter to newly confirmed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair 
Jay Clayton urging him to take action on women’s underrepresentation on corporate 
boards, with the accompanying press release stating that “[t]he SEC has the 
opportunity and ability to enforce the transparency that is critical to securing gender 
balanced corporate leadership. Boardrooms with gender parity lead stronger, healthier 
companies, return more to their shareholders, and help our economy grow.”13 
According to a recent study, companies with the highest percentage of women on 
their boards had a rate of return nearly fifty-three percent higher than companies with 
the lowest percentage of female board members.14 Indeed, while the social duty to 
promote equality remains paramount to diversity initiatives, the emerging empirical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. Healy, supra note 3.  
 10. See, e.g., Emily Chasan, BlackRock Puts Its Votes Behind Proposals to Get Women 
on Boards, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2017, 8:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2017-07-14/blackrock-puts-its-votes-behind-proposals-to-get-women-on-boards [https:// 
perma.cc/64V2-T7P5]; Ryan Vlastelica, Vanguard Calls for More Diverse Corporate Boards, 
Better Climate-Change Disclosures, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 1, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www 
.marketwatch.com/story/vanguard-calls-for-more-diverse-corporate-boards-better-climate 
-change-disclosures-2017-08-31 [https://perma.cc/22QU-875L]. 
 11. Abe M. Friedman, Erica K. Lukoski, Bob McCormick & Eric Sumberg, NYC Pension 
Funds Boardroom Accountability Project Version 2.0, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Sept. 19, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/19/nyc-pension-funds 
-boardroom-accountability-project-version-2-0 [https://perma.cc/6X9K-KAPQ]. 
 12. Press Release, ISS, ISS Announces 2018 Benchmark Policy Updates (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-announces-2018-benchmark-policy-updates [https:// 
perma.cc/AQ5G-XSWN] (adopting a new policy on board gender diversity in Canada); 
Dimitri Zagoroff, Policy Guidelines Updated: United States, Canada, Shareholder Initiatives 
GLASS LEWIS (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.glasslewis.com/policy-guidelines-updated-united 
-states-canada-shareholder-initiatives [https://perma.cc/3M8D-LZS4] (stating that the 
company’s 2018 guidelines will feature an increased discussion of board gender diversity in 
its reports, including a phased policy that will see nomination committee chairs targeted with 
against/withhold recommendations if boards do not include a female director or provide a 
cogent explanation for their absence, by 2019). 
 13. Letter from Carolyn B. Maloney & Donald S. Beyer, Jr., Members of Congress, to 
Jay Clayton, Chair, SEC (May 30, 2017), https://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney 
.house.gov/files/Maloney%20Beyer%20Ltr%20Clayton%205.30.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6MSU-DLYS]; Press Release, Carolyn B. Maloney, Reps. Maloney and Beyer Press New 
SEC Chairman to Act on Boardroom Diversity (May 30, 2017), https://maloney.house 
.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-maloney-and-beyer-press-new-sec-chairman-to-act 
-on-boardroom [https://perma.cc/QG5A-XF4U]. 
 14. JOY ET AL., supra note 8. 
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evidence suggesting better rates of return with more diverse boardrooms has 
transformed the public discourse in a profound way. Diversity is no longer just a 
desirable social cause, advocated for by advocacy groups and third-sector actors;15 it 
is now also a matter of better corporate governance and thus can enjoy, and harness, 
the support of the investor community—in particular large institutional investors.16  
Yet, even with the recent pressure from legislatures and investors, as of 2017, 
women comprised merely 16.2% of corporate boards.17 Many companies still have 
no female directors on their board,18 with some companies failing to have had any 
female directors over the past decade.19 
The lack of gender diversity in boardrooms is further exacerbated by the lack of 
sufficient turnover at the board level.20 With very few board seats opening to new 
directors each year,21 improving diversity becomes increasingly difficult. However, 
boards and investors are intent on addressing this concern. Existing trends towards 
board refreshment, as part of the growing emphasis on director independence, will 
certainly present boards with more opportunities to appoint new female directors in 
an effort to improve gender diversity in the boardroom.22 Indeed, women and 
minorities accounted for half of the 397 newest independent directors at S&P 500 
companies in 2017.23  
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See Lublin & Krouse, supra note 5. 
 16. Anthony Goodman & Rusty O’Kelley, Institutional Investors Lead Push for Gender-
Diverse Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 26, 2017), https:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/26/institutional-investors-lead-push-for-gender-diverse 
-boards [https://perma.cc/43TH-CFFY]. A recent ISS survey found that more than two-thirds 
(sixty-nine percent) of investor respondents consider it problematic if there are zero female 
directors on a public company board. ISS, supra note 12. 
 17. DAN MARCEC, EQUILAR, EQUILAR GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX: Q3 2017 (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.equilar.com/reports/52-gender-diversity-index-q3-2017 [https://perma.cc/8FZK 
-WQ3T] (providing data for the Russell 3000 index); Joann S. Lublin, Dozens of Boards 
Excluded Women for Years, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:03 AM), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-boards-excluded-women-for-years-1482847381 [https://perma 
.cc/LF62-LVPW] (providing similar statistics for the Fortune 1000 companies). 
 18. Anders Keitz, Five S&P 500 Boards Have No Women as Gender Balance Growth 
Stalls, YAHOO! FINANCE (June 26, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/five-p-500-boards-
no-161700143.html [https://perma.cc/2FMK-QMCL]; Lublin, supra note 17; Quick Take: 
Women on Corporate Boards Globally, CATALYST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www 
.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-corporate-boards-globally [https://perma.cc/3EW9-C5EL]. 
 19. Lublin, supra note 17. 
 20. See AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, 
GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 44 (2015) (describing the refreshment problem); N.Y. STOCK 
EXCH., NYSE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDE, at iv (Steven A. Rosenblum et al. eds., 2014). 
 21. SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX SURVEY (2017), 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/ssbi-2017-perspective [https://perma.cc 
/X6EX-3BWW] (noting that board turnover remains low and hinders meaningful progress in 
the percentage of women and minorities in boardrooms). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. According to a recent survey released by Spencer Stuart of 397 independent 
director slots open in the 2017 proxy season, 36% went to women. See SPENCER STUART supra 
note 21; see also Jeff Green, Women and Minorities Are the Majority of New Board Seats for 
the First Time, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
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Still, these opportunities must be utilized appropriately and advance meaningful 
gender diversity and equality in the boardroom. The now-infamous incident at Uber, 
when David Bonderman, the cofounder of the acclaimed private equity firm TPG, 
said that more women on the board means “more talking,”24 points to a larger 
concern: do women get a fair and equal chance to contribute? Indeed, when it comes 
to gender diversity in corporate boardrooms, numbers matter, but so do the specific 
roles that women take on while on the board. 
As this Article argues and empirically demonstrates, there is a fundamental 
difference between solely meeting numerical diversity “targets” and achieving true 
diversity in the boardroom. Therefore, investors and advocates of gender diversity 
must not only account for the ratio of gender-diverse directors in the boardroom. 
They must also account for the roles and functions that these directors serve once 
elected to the board—what in other contexts is often termed as substantive equality.25 
Contemporary academic discourse on the topic of gender diversity on boards can 
be divided into three main strands. First, there are studies that survey the current 
landscape of board gender diversity.26 These studies examine the number of women 
currently filling board directorships as well as historical trends related to gender 
diversity.27 A second strand examines the impact of gender diversity on the financial 
performance of a company, attempting to determine whether boards that are more 
diverse improve performance or other observable characteristics of companies.28 
Finally, a third strand centers on the social understanding of board diversity, asking 
how gender effects board dynamics and operation.29 Taken together, many of these 
                                                                                                                 
 
/articles/2017-12-06/women-minorities-capture-most-new-board-seats-for-first-time [https:// 
perma.cc/PM9A-Y84Y]. 
 24. Mike Isaac & Susan Chira, David Bonderman Resigns from Uber Board After Sexist 
Remark, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/uber 
-sexual-harassment-huffington-bonderman.html [https://perma.cc/7V6Z-DCNH]. 
 25. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Foreword: Conceptualizing Substantive Justice, 13 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 533 (2010); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal 
Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687 (1986). 
 26. See, e.g., DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 
2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg 
-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-perspective4.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q7-HTUT]; BORIS 
GROYSBERG, YO-JUD CHENG & DEBORAH BELL, SPENCER STUART & 
WOMENCORPORATEDIRECTORS FOUNDATION, 2016 GLOBAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS SURVEY 
(2016), https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.womencorporatedirectors.com/resource/resmgr 
/Knowledge_Bank/WCDBoardSurvey2016_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/47RN-Z83U]; JOY 
ET AL., supra note 8.  
 27. DELOITTE, supra note 26; GROYSBERG ET AL., supra note 26; JOY ET AL., supra note 8. 
 28. See, e.g., Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull & Karin Vetter, Gender Diversity in the 
Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?”, 118 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 61 (2012); Joana Marinova, Janneke Plantenga & Chantal Remery, Gender Diversity 
& Firm Performance: Evidence from Dutch and Danish Boardrooms, 27 INT’L J. HUM. 
RESOURCE MGMT. 1777 (2016). 
 29. See, e.g., Nada K. Kakabadse, Catarina Figueira, Katerina Nicolopoulou, Jessica 
Hong Yang, Andrew P. Kakabadse & Mustafa F. Özbilgin, Gender Diversity and Board 
Performance: Women’s Experiences and Perspectives, 54 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 265 
(2015). 
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studies ultimately conclude that either economic or moral forces (or both) support 
the push for increasing board diversity.30 
Until this point, however, current academic discourse has had a dearth of 
empirical data dissecting the specific roles of women once they are elected to serve 
on a board and contrasting them with their peer male directors.31 For instance, 
information is still lacking concerning important questions such as: what board 
committees do women tend to sit on;32 do they hold similar leadership roles; what is 
their tenure compared to their male counterparts; and what industries have higher 
percentages of female participation? Such details help reveal whether the 
metaphorical glass ceiling is truly broken for an individual woman once she enters a 
boardroom or whether female directors are still subject to disparities even while 
serving as directors.  
The answer to this question is central to gender diversity discourse. As this Article 
demonstrates,33 substantive gender diversity on boards matters. It matters if you 
believe in gender diversity on boards as part of a social cause. It also matters if you 
believe that gender-diverse boards lead to better company performance. 
This Article is the first to examine this question in detail and to provide data on 
both an absolute as well as relative level of female participation in the boardroom. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See DELOITTE, supra note 26; GROYSBERG ET AL., supra note 26; JOY ET AL., supra 
note 8; Joecks et al., supra note 28; Marinova et al., supra note 28; see also Vathunyoo Sila, 
Angelica Gonzalez & Jens Hagendorf, Women on Board: Does Boardroom Gender Diversity 
Really Affect Firm Risk?, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 26 (2016) (finding a negative relationship between 
gender diversity and equity risk); Silva Del Prete & Maria Lucia Stefani, Women as ‘Gold 
Dust’: Gender Diversity in Top Boards and the Performance of Italian Banks, (Banca D’Italia, 
Working Paper No. 1014, 2015), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione 
/2015/2015-1014/en_tema_1014.pdf?language_id=1 [https://perma.cc/KS97-WGUY] 
(finding increased women on Italian bank boards has a positive effect on both the quality of 
credit and bank profitability); Marcus Noland, Tyler Moran & Barbara Kotschwar, Is Gender 
Diversity Profitable? Evidence from a Global Survey, (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working 
Paper No. 16-3, 2016), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-3.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/E2GA-5AVC] (finding data from more than ninety-one countries suggests the presence of 
women in the boardroom or upper management improves a company’s financial performance).  
 31. There are three earlier studies that have charted limited (and now dated) data 
regarding committee roles of women, but without contrasting the data to men or controlling 
for the women ratio on the board. See Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Dalton, Women and 
Corporate Boards of Directors: The Promise of Increased, and Substantive, Participation in 
the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 257 (2010); Idalene F. Kesner, Directors’ 
Characteristics and Committee Membership: An Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, 
and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66 (1988); Craig A. Peterson & James Philpot, Women’s 
Roles on U.S. Fortune 500 Boards: Director Expertise and Committee Memberships, 72 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 177 (2007). A more recent study has focused on women’s committee work in 
relation to their compensation. See Laura Casares Field, Matthew E. Souther & Adam S. Yore, 
Does Diversity Pay in the Boardroom? (2d Annual Fin. Insts., Regulation & Corp. Governance 
Conference) (Mar. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810543 [https://perma.cc/74P5-J3QK]. 
 32. Board committee service correlates with the ability of directors to exert influence on 
corporate policy. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.  
 33. See infra Section I.D (discussing the importance of substantive gender diversity to 
both strands of justifications for gender diversity on boards). 
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The Article, for the years 2007 to 2015, examines the ratio of women on boards 
within the S&P 1500 companies, their board leadership roles, whether these women 
would be classified as “busy” or “overboarded directors,”34 the length of their tenure, 
and their likelihood of key board committee participation. Additionally, these 
numbers are compared with similar metrics for their male counterparts.  
The empirical findings reveal significant differences between male and female 
directors, extending from their tenure to the roles they hold while on the board. 
Women have shorter tenures, are less likely to hold leadership roles, and are stretched 
more thinly than their male counterparts.35 These previously underexplored 
differences highlight that in addition to the highly addressed quantitative gender 
disparity on U.S. boards lies an equally concerning substantive gender disparity36 
that has yet to be addressed. Accordingly, current calls for board diversity and the 
current disclosure regime must internalize the lessons these new empirical data 
present. Gender diversity discourse, therefore, must look beyond the numbers of 
female directors on the board and account for the roles that these directors take once 
appointed. 
Underscoring the fact that current disclosure practices of companies do little to 
provide investors with information regarding the board’s gender diversity, the Article 
then brings together these two strands—the importance of substantive gender 
diversity and the deficiencies in the current disclosure regime—by calling for a shift 
towards an enhanced disclosure regime. Specifically, the Article advocates for the 
SEC to require companies to provide investors with both substantive and quantitative 
measures of gender diversity on the boardroom through the adoption of a Substantive 
Gender Diversity Disclosure (SGDD) form. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the importance of gender diversity 
in the boardroom, the different justifications for improving gender diversity, and the 
importance of substantive gender diversity to these justifications. Part II provides the 
results of the empirical analysis and an interpretation of the findings. Part III 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Busy directors are directors who participate on multiple boards and therefore may be 
“too busy” engaging in their various director activities. See, e.g., ISS, 2016 BENCHMARK 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.issgovernance.com/file 
/policy/2016-americas-policy-updates.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZLE-4M9R] (summarizing 
academic research defining “busy” as a director who serves on three or more boards). 
Overboarded directors are similarly defined as directors who sit on too many boards. See ISS, 
UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 12 (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.issgovernance 
.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3Z4-QJ29]. 
ISS indicated it would vote against a director sitting on more than five public company boards 
or if a CEO, on more than one additional board. Id. 
 35. These results confirm earlier observations regarding increased committee work for 
women. See, e.g., Pornsit Jiraporn, Manohar Singh & Chun I. Lee, Ineffective Corporate 
Governance: Director Busyness and Board Committee Memberships, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 
819 (2009). 
 36. This Article uses the term “substantive gender diversity” in a manner that varies from 
the usage of “substantive equality” in the literature in other contexts, in particular the 
antidiscrimination literature. Specifically, in this Article the term “substantive gender 
diversity” is focused on ensuring gender inclusion beyond the numerical ratio of women. 
Broad discussion of substantive equality as defined in the antidiscrimination literature is 
beyond the Article’s scope. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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discusses the current regulatory framework and its flaws, and Part IV discusses the 
policy implications, advancing a call for an improved gender diversity disclosure 
regime.  
I. GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE BOARDROOM—WHAT’S AT STAKE 
A. The Board of Directors’ Important Role in 
 the Governance of the Corporation 
Gender diversity in the boardroom is of particular interest due to the important 
role of boards in modern U.S. corporate governance.  
As the core organ of the modern corporation, the board is tasked with several 
important roles in the governance of the corporation.37 First, while most of the 
operational decision-making can be, and is, delegated to management, the board is 
still required to be an active participant in some of the more important managerial 
business decisions, such as mergers, stock issuance, and change of company 
governance documents.38 Second, the board is a resource for management to utilize. 
The board provides insight and advice, as well as networking benefits, and facilitates 
the firm’s access to various resources.39  
Third, the board is charged with a monitoring role.40 The dispersed ownership 
structure of U.S. publicly held corporations41 presents a severe agency cost between 
management and shareholders.42 Shareholders’ lack of incentive to supervise 
management due to their dispersed ownership, coupled with free riding concerns, 
effectively leads to a managerial controlled corporate structure. One of the first 
institutions asked to mitigate this agency issue was the board of directors.43 The 
board is expected to represent shareholders’ interest vis-à-vis management,44 
curtailing management’s ability to extract private benefits or act in a suboptimal way 
with respect to shareholder interests.45 While the recent rise in shareholder activism 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern 
Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975). 
 38. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
45–46 (2012). 
 39. See id. at 45–47. 
 40. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 155–67 (2008) (detailing the role of the board monitoring management); JONATHAN 
R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 50 (2008) (listing 
major corporate governance mechanisms for U.S. public companies); Jill E. Fisch, Taking 
Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–72 (1997).  
 41. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 7 (rev. ed. 1991).  
 42. Agency cost can be defined as the “costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set 
of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.” Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983). 
 43. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468–69 (2007). 
 44. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 40, 155–57 (detailing the role of the board and its 
importance in the governance of the firm). 
 45. See Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board 
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by hedge funds46 and the rise in institutional investors’ engagement with companies47 
have given shareholders a better ability to counteract these monitoring concerns, the 
board has taken an even greater role in the engagement with shareholders.48 The 
board, therefore, has become a conduit, allowing investors to formally and informally 
engage with the company.49  
Importantly, while boards meet regularly, often eight to twelve times a year,50 
many important board decisions are delegated to specific board committees, which 
are tasked with a particular mandate. Board committees meet separately from the full 
board, are composed of subsets of board members, and tend to have specific, 
narrowly defined functions.51 While boards may have various committees, there are 
several key committees that all publicly traded companies must maintain52 and that 
are often cited as having the greatest influence on corporate governance.53 These key 
                                                                                                                 
 
Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541, 583–84 (2010) (focusing on the boards’ broader duties 
in the context of a controlling shareholder); see also Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation 
as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 129–35 (2008) (describing directors’ fiduciary 
duty to adopt shareholders’ ends). 
 46. See, e.g., Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty 
Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017) 
(summarizing and synthesizing the findings from seventy-three studies that examine the 
effects of shareholder activism); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of 
Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN 55 (2007); Jim Rossman, 
Chris Couvelier & Kashyap Shah, Review of Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 30, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018 
/07/30/review-of-shareholder-activism-1h-2018 [https://perma.cc/W8WU-N4T7]. 
 47. Paula Loop, Catherine Bromilow & Leah Malone, The Changing Face of Shareholder 
Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://corpgov 
.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/01/the-changing-face-of-shareholder-activism [https://perma.cc 
/L6WG-MRJY]. 
 48. See Krystal Gaboury Berrini & Rob Zivnuska, Board Lessons: Succeeding with 
Investors in a Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 5, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/05/board-lessons-succeeding-with-investors-in-a 
-crisis [https://perma.cc/8Y3P-GMSW]. 
 49. See Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (May 31, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/31/spotlight-on 
-boards-2018 [https://perma.cc/5EN2-SZ4L]. 
 50. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 21 (stating that in 2017 boards met an average of 
8.2 times). 
 51. See Eileen Morgan Johnson, The Basics of Board Committee Structure, ASAE (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.asaecenter.org/resources/articles/an_plus/2015/december/the-basics 
-of-board-committee-structure [https://perma.cc/RSR6-6TAQ]. 
 52. See Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 
HASTINGS L.J. 97, 109–10 (2016); see also SPENCER STUART, supra note 21. 
 53. Idalene F. Kesner, Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: An 
Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66, 67–68 (1988); 
see also David A. Carter, Frank D’Souza, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, The Gender 
and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 
18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 396, 400–01 (2010); April Klein, Firm Performance and 
Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 277–80 (1998).  
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committees are the audit committee,54 the nominating committee,55 the corporate 
governance committee,56 and the compensation committee.57 Research has shown 
that directors have a stronger, more direct impact on executive compensation, new 
director selection, and other important board actions if they serve on board 
committees that are tasked with the primary responsibility for these functions.58 
Consequently, accounting for a director’s specific board committee membership 
provides a more accurate picture of the director’s role on the board. 
B. Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards 
The board’s importance as a corporate organ has led to increased scrutiny 
regarding its composition and structure.59 In recent years, board gender diversity has 
become one of the biggest issues looming over corporate boardrooms, with some 
dubbing board composition as “the” issue of 2017.60 With State Street, Vanguard, 
and Blackrock voicing their commitment to this issue,61 it is not surprising that in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. The audit committee is charged with ensuring the quality and integrity of the 
company’s financial statements and regulatory compliance. Under NYSE listing rules, the 
committee must be comprised solely of independent directors. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Section 
303A.07 Audit Committee Additional Requirements, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (Aug. 
22, 2013), http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4 
_3_8&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/L77T-PBCT]. 
 55. The nominating committee is in charge of nominating director candidates and often 
also selects new CEOs and peer directors to the other board committees. See Joseph V. 
Carcello, Terry L. Neal, Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, CEO Involvement in Selecting 
Board Members, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Restatements, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 
396, 397–401 (2011). 
 56. The corporate governance committee is responsible for assisting a corporate board in 
matters related to the corporation’s governance structure. DIRTT ENVTL. SOLS., CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE CHARTER 2 (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.dirtt.net/assets 
/attachments/59cdebe4e1/DIRTT-GovernanceCommittee-Jan18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZU9 
-BZCH]. 
 57. The compensation committee is tasked with setting the compensation of senior 
executives and generally oversees the corporation’s compensation policies. Under NYSE 
listing rules the committee must be comprised solely of independent directors. See N.Y. Stock 
Exch., Section 303A.05 Compensation Committee, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (Jan. 11, 
2013), http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3 
_6&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/VD5A-BJRE]. 
 58. See Klein, supra note 53, at 279–80. 
 59. See, e.g., Marc S. Gerber, US Corporate Governance: Boards of Directors Face 
Increased Scrutiny, SKADDEN (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/insights 
/publications/2014/01/us-corporate-governance-boards-of-directors-face-i [https://perma.cc 
/WNN5-2QSM]; Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, Governance Mechanisms, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Role of Technology 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687138 [https://perma.cc/7YQJ-SGFM]. 
 60. Paula Loop, A Look at Board Composition: How Does Your Industry Stack Up?, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard 
.edu/2017/03/06/a-look-at-board-composition-how-does-your-industry-stack-up [https:// 
perma.cc/53UW-DCDLa]. 
 61. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
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2017 the number of board diversity proposals reached an all-time high.62 These 
proposals are also gaining stronger support from investors, with many large 
institutions voting in favor of such proposals.63 Proxy advisors have also shown 
support for the issue. ISS Analytics, a leading shareholder advisory firm, 
recommended that shareholders vote “for” all but two of the diversity proposals 
voted on in 2017.64 Furthermore, diversity proposals that were voted on received, on 
average, 28.3% of votes cast, which is a strong level of support in the context of 
social responsibility proposals.65 Moreover, the support level for diversity proposals 
has increased significantly, compared to 2016 where only 19.1% of votes cast 
supported these resolutions, with 28.3% of such proposals in 2017 receiving majority 
support and many more that settled prior to a vote.66 
Most of these proposals requested that the board increase the diversity of its 
candidate pools, provide reports on actions taken by the board to increase diversity, 
or both.67 Additionally, the California State Teachers Retirement System 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. See Ronald O. Mueller & Elizabeth Ising, Shareholder Proposal Developments 
During the 2017 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 12, 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/12/shareholder-proposal-developments 
-during-the-2017-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/F2NJ-QGGF] (“Thirty-five proposals 
calling for the adoption of a policy on board diversity or a report on steps to increase board 
diversity were submitted in 2017 as compared to 28 proposals submitted in 2016. As in 2016, 
a substantial number of board diversity proposals were withdrawn, likely due to commitments 
made by companies to the proponents of these proposals, such as adopting board recruitment 
policies inclusive of race and/or gender.”); see also Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors 
Push Corporate Boards to Add Women, People of Color, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:49 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/shareholders-target-pale-male 
-and-stale-corporate-boards [https://perma.cc/YC27-9GEV] (noting that according to ISS 
Analytics, 2017 shareholder proposals regarding diversity are on pace to meet or exceed the 
number of similar proposals from 2016). 
 63. For example, on April 27, 2017, a shareholder proposal to add women and minorities 
to the board at Cognex Corp. received 62.8% support with major institutional investors voting 
in favor. Among the supporters were Allianz, AXA Investment Managers, Florida State Board 
of Administration, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, Vanguard, BNY Mellon, and T. Row 
Price Associates COGNEX CORPORATION: PROPOSAL SUMMARY, PROXY INSIGHT (2017). 
 64. Mueller & Ising, supra note 62 (noting that according to ISS Analytics, 2017 
shareholder proposals regarding diversity are on pace to meet or exceed the number of similar 
proposals from 2016). 
 65. Id. Most shareholder proposals regarding social aspects get less than one-third of the 
votes with many barely crossing the 10% support level. Therefore, close to 30% support level 
is in fact large, and many companies, once such proposals receive these levels of support, 
further engage with shareholders to achieve a negotiated agreement. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron 
Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors Apathy, 41 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 77–78 (2016) (discussing the 30% support level and company engagement 
with shareholders). 
 66. Mueller & Ising, supra note 62; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, 
Corporate Governance Update: Prioritizing Board Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/30 
/corporate-governance-update-prioritizing-board-diversity [https://perma.cc/EH3F-RVCY]. 
 67. Green & Chasan, supra note 62; Arthur H. Kohn, Elizabeth K. Bieber & Maria I. 
Maldonado, Board Diversity Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
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(“CalSTRS”) submitted letters to 125 California corporations without female 
directors strongly suggesting the inclusion of women on the board.68 Subsequently, 
thirty-five of these boards added at least one female to their boards.69  
Yet, while 86% of directors participating in PwC’s annual director survey stated 
they felt that women should comprise between 21% and 50% of the board,70 only 
28% of Russell 3000 boards have more than one-fifth of their board comprised of 
women.71 Indeed, as of October 2017, on average, women comprise 16.2% of Russell 
3000 boards.72 The outlook is slightly better at the larger companies where women 
represent 20.8% of directors on Fortune 1000 boards.73  
Further, some boards in the United States have failed to even attempt to promote 
gender diversity.74 A recent report noted that of the 1500 largest Russell 3000 
companies, seventy-six companies failed to have any female directors over the past 
decade.75 An additional thirteen companies added a female director for the first time 
in 2016.76  
At this current rate, projections show that corporate boards will not reach gender 
parity until 2055.77 In reaction to this slow growth, groups such as the Thirty Percent 
Coalition78 and 2020 Women on Boards have organized in an attempt to increase 
female board participation at an even quicker rate.79 These organizations seek to 
                                                                                                                 
 
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/21/board-diversity-developments 
[https://perma.cc/6GDZ-6MFW]. See generally RAJEEV KUMAR, GEORGESON, 2016 ANNUAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW (2016), https://www.georgeson.com/us/Documents/acgr 
/acgr2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KPL-2BCA]. Though influential institutional investors such 
as the California Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”) strongly support such 
proposals, some fund managers prefer to vote against such proposals and engage directly with 
the board. See, e.g., Green & Chasan, supra note 62. 
 68. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 66. 
 69. Id. 
 70. PWC, PWC’S 2016 ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 6 (Oct. 2016), https:// 
www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/annual-corporate-directors-survey/assets 
/pwc-2016-annual-corporate--directors--survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4RM-FRXC]. 
 71. MARCEC, supra note 17. 
 72. See id. 
 73. 2020 WOMEN ON BDS., GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX: 2011–2017 PROGRESS OF WOMEN 
CORPORATE BOARD DIRECTORS BY COMPANY, SIZE, STATE AND SECTOR 1 (2017), 
https://www.2020wob.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2017_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S7R3-BRA4]. 
 74. See Lublin, supra note 17. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Green & Chasan, supra note 62. 
 78. “The mission of the Thirty Percent Coalition is to promote gender diversity, including 
women of color, on corporate boards. . . . [F]ollowing the Coalition’s Institutional Investors’ 
initiatives more than more than [sic] 180 companies have appointed a woman to their boards 
and, in many instances, a woman of color. The Coalition’s investors represent more than $3.5 
trillion in assets under management and continue to have a major impact.” THIRTY PERCENT 
COALITION, https://www.30percentcoalition.org [https://perma.cc/6N86-FU2F]. 
 79. The organization 2020 Women on Boards seeks to make all boards composed of at 
least twenty percent women by the year 2020. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, https://www 
.2020wob.com [https://perma.cc/KV6Q-LGHJ]. 
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refocus the criteria considered for directorships to increase the number of women 
considered for these positions.80 
One of the key hurdles to improving diversity is the low turnover of directors. If 
companies appoint new directors infrequently, the ability to increase the gender 
diversity of the board is significantly reduced.81 Aside from the refreshment problem, 
lack of leadership experience is often cited as one of the main barriers to increased 
gender diversity in the boardroom.82 Because women, as well as minorities, have yet 
to hold leadership positions within corporate America on the same scale and level as 
white men, this prerequisite for nomination limits the number of diverse candidates.83  
Because many companies seek operational and executive experience in their 
board nominees in order to raise investor confidence in the board, the 
underrepresentation of female executives in corporate America also limits the 
opportunities available to women to serve as directors.84 However, the limited pool 
argument does not seem to explain the current disparities.85 Further building on the 
issue is the limited ability to network or add meaningful director experience for 
women.86 As this Article will later develop, a majority of directors serve on multiple 
boards. Whether due to the same nomination criteria, the ability to network within 
boards, or the additional qualification of prior experience, the limited number of 
upper-management positions held by women severely limits the growth in gender 
diversity within the boardroom.  
C. The Two-Headed Case for Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards 
Why does gender diversity in boardrooms matter, and what are the justifications 
supporting investors and regulators’ push for a change in board composition? These 
questions are at the core of the gender diversity debate. Broadly, the push for gender 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See How To Find Qualified Women to Serve on Corporate Boards, 2020 WOMEN ON 
BOARDS, https://www.2020wob.com/learn/how-find-qualified-women-serve-corporate 
-boards [https://perma.cc/BB86-4RM8]; Who We Are, THIRTY PERCENT COALITION, 
https://www.30percentcoalition.org/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/V6FJ-7P9W]. 
 81. See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20, at 44; Nili, supra note 52, at 139. 
 82. Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much 
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 402 (2014); see also DHIR, supra 
note 20, at 38–46. 
 83. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and 
Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 599–601 (2006) [hereinafter 
Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline]. 
 84. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 40 (stating the “CEO experience has become ‘a quick 
litmus test for qualified board candidates’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 85. See Amanda K. Packel, Government Intervention into Board Composition: Gender 
Quotas in Norway and Diversity Disclosures in the United States, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
192, 198–200 (2016) (reviewing AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: 
CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2015)). 
 86. A 2012 study of 1000 directors from fifty-eight countries found that while men tend 
to attribute lack of diversity to a “small pool” argument, women mostly attributed it to the 
male network argument. See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, 2012 BOARD OF DIRECTORS SURVEY 3 
(2012). 
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diversity on boards rests on two distinct pillars. The first is grounded in social cause. 
The second makes an instrumental case for gender diversity.  
1. The Social Cause Case for Gender Diversity 
The social cause case for gender diversity is rooted in the larger gender equality, 
antidiscrimination, and feminist movement of the 1960s.87 Gender diversity on 
boards provides equal opportunity to women who historically were excluded from 
positions of power. Advocates of board gender diversity—like advocates of gender 
equality in other sectors—therefore rely on moral or social justifications in their push 
for gender diversity on the board.  
Their case is premised on the intrinsic notion that increasing diversity is the “right 
thing to do,”88 predominantly because the efforts to improve diversity are aimed at 
correcting the lingering effects of discrimination.89 “There is a strong public interest 
in ensuring that opportunities are available to all, . . . that women entering the labo[]r 
market are able to fulfil their potential, and that we make full use of the wealth of 
talented women” available for board service.90  
Accordingly, some scholars argue that the rationale for improving diversity 
should reside in the justifications related to social benefits and duties.91 That is, social 
justice, equal opportunity, and corporate reputation should be enough to promote 
gender diversity within the board.92 Indeed, this social argument seems to carry some 
weight even within boards themselves.93 However, historically, advocacy efforts 
based solely on moral and social justice justifications have mostly failed to gain much 
traction with Main and Wall Street investors, leaving boards free to maintain their 
male-dominated composition.94 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 58; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the 
Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated 
with Women of Color, 79 St. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2005). 
 88. Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 854, 856–57 (2011) [hereinafter Fairfax, Same Old Story]. 
 89. Id.; see also J. Cunyon Gordon, Painting by Numbers: “And, Um, Let’s Have a Black 
Lawyer Sit at Our Table”, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1277 (2003) (describing a university 
president’s attitude that diversity is just “the right thing to do”); Vance Knapp & Bonnie Kae 
Grover, Note, The Corporate Law Firm—Can It Achieve Diversity?, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 
298, 303 (1993) (“Law firms should hire more minority attorneys, of course, for reasons of 
simple justice.”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is 
Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black 
Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1553 (2004). 
 90. HOUSE OF LORDS [H.L.], EUR. UNION COMM., WOMEN ON BOARDS: REPORT 13–14 
(Nov. 9, 2012) (U.K.). 
 91. Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 395–401; see also DHIR, supra note 20, at 64–68. 
 92. Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 424. 
 93. As noted in the PwC study, almost eighty-three percent of directors feel that having 
females represent more than twenty percent is a good thing both commercially and morally. 
Yet, as seen in the same study and in practice, even coupled with the business case for 
diversity, the number of women on boards has yet to materialize to these numbers. PWC, supra 
note 70, at 6. 
 94. Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 855–57. 
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2. The Instrumental Case for Gender Diversity  
In recent years, many gender diversity advocates have shifted the core of their 
advocacy from social and moral justifications to a more instrumental case for 
diversity.95 This second pillar is focused on the benefits that gender-diverse boards 
provide to companies and investors and therefore on the “corporate governance case” 
for improving diversity on boards.  
Two rationales exist to explain the instrumental value of gender-diverse boards. 
The first suggests that groups that are more diverse generally make better decisions. 
Studies have shown that a group of high-functioning diverse individuals tends to 
outperform a nondiverse group of the best performing individuals.96 The second 
rationale suggests that boards focused on gender diversity within the boardroom are 
also more likely to utilize talent pools more effectively and have a better 
understanding of the employee and customer bases, and that signaling that the 
company cares about diversity may be effective in bolstering economic arguments.97 
The instrumental case for gender diversity encompasses a large spectrum of 
benefits. Broadly speaking, it could be divided into two main strands. The first 
focuses on corporate performance in its narrow sense—the corporate bottom line.98 
The second focuses on performance in the broader sense—the way boards work, 
group dynamics, risk taking, accounting integrity, and other less quantifiable 
governance measures.99  
a. Bottom Line Performance 
A growing body of studies has linked gender-diverse boards and improved 
corporate performance.100 For example, MSCI conducted a study in 2015 to test the 
hypothesis that increased gender diversity within the boardroom correlates with 
increased corporate performance for that year.101 This study analyzed companies 
with “strong female leadership.”102 In 2016, it conducted a similar study, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 58–64; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 884–
85.  
 96. See, e.g., Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can 
Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
16385, 16389 (2004). 
 97. See Packel, supra note 85, at 217–18. Importantly, more women in the boardroom is 
also associated with more women in senior management positions and below. Similar to 
boardroom gender diversity, gender diversity within senior levels of management correlates 
with better company performance, and female board member participation may pave the way 
for a more gender diverse management. Id. 
 98. See JOY ET AL., supra note 8. 
 99. See Packel, supra note 85, at 200–04; see also DHIR, supra note 20, at 58–64; Fairfax, 
Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 879–90; Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 393–401. 
 100. See MEGGIN THWING EASTMAN, DAIMON RALLIS & GAIA MAZZUCCHELL, MSCI, THE 
TIPPING POINT: WOMEN ON BOARDS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 6–8 (2016).  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. “Strong female leadership” was categorized as a company having a female CEO 
and at least one woman on the board, three or more women on the board, or a higher than 
country average percentage of women on the board. Id. at 6 n.6. 
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this time analyzing returns over a five-year period and separating companies into 
those that reached the “tipping point” of women in the boardroom with those with 
no women on the board.103 Thus, the MSCI study attempted to test whether having 
this critical mass positively impacted company performance.104 Both studies returned 
the same result: companies with “strong female leadership” enjoyed better rates of 
return than their counterparts without a female board director.105  
These recent studies join earlier studies finding a relationship between gender 
diversity and performance.106 Referencing these studies allows gender diversity 
supporters to “pitch” their concerns to an otherwise skeptical public.107 
However, the business case in its narrowest sense—a positive effect on 
accounting measures or stock price—has yet to definitively establish that gender 
diversity is the cause of an increase in the bottom line.108  
Linking corporate performance to specific board attributes is inherently difficult, 
and therefore it is not surprising that the case for bottom line performance has 
produced a mixed bag of empirical results. First, while positive correlations have 
been seen with increased gender diversity, researchers acknowledge that “correlation 
does not imply causation.”109 For example, the recent MSCI studies failed to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Id. at 6–7. The theory behind the “tipping point” is that having three or more similar 
“minorities” within a group provides a critical mass to present opposing and additional 
viewpoints. Id. By reaching this number, the gender parity on the board is seen as an actual 
change as opposed to the mere ability to state that the board itself is diverse. However, the 
study does not provide evidence that merely having one or two female directors does not 
positively affect corporate performance as well. Id. at 11. 
 104. See id. at 15. 
 105. Id. at 3. Companies with “strong female leadership” had a Return on Equity (ROE) of 
10.1% whereas companies without female directors had a ROE of 7.4%. Id. at 3. The 2016 
five-year study narrowed the focus to U.S. companies, and the results suggested an even more 
drastic discrepancy between companies who had reached the “tipping point” of female board 
inclusions and those without a female director. The “tipping point” group had a median ROE 
of 10% and an Earnings Per Share (EPS) increase over the time period of 37%. Id. The group 
devoid of female directors, on the other hand, had a ROE of 1% and an EPS of -8%. Id. 
 106. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 383–93. 
 107. See CATALYST, 2007 CENSUS: BOARD DIRECTORS at 1 (2007), https://www 
.catalyst.org/system/files/census_board_final.pdf; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, at 
860–65 (addressing the business rationales for diversity and arguing that diversity advocates 
must pay greater attention to the role of social and moral justifications in the effort to diversify 
the corporate boardroom); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. 
REV. 795, 810–38 (2005) (evaluating the different business rationales for board diversity and 
the risks they may entail).  
 108. See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact 
on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 308 (2009) (“Although a positive 
relation between gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance is often cited in the 
popular press, it is not robust to any of our methods of addressing the endogeneity of gender 
diversity.”); Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 383–93 (reviewing the issues with the narrow 
business case for diversity and discussing the explanations for the varied results). 
 109. See, e.g., Darren Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More than a Woman: Insights into 
Corporate Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 902–03 (2015) 
(noting that most studies caution that evidence of a causal relationship is “suggestive rather 
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establish a statistically significant causal link between the presence of women and 
their performance metrics.110 
Second, despite the recent wave of studies supporting a positive correlation 
between gender diversity and bottom line performance, other conflicting studies 
show that diverse boards fail to truly outperform the market111 and that there had 
been a drop in corporate performance after the initiation of a quota in certain 
countries.112 These findings, and the difficulties inherent in linking corporate 
performance to specific board attributes, have led some scholars and gender equality 
advocates to refocus the instrumental case on corporate performance in its broader 
sense.113  
b. Board Dynamics and Governance 
Empirical evidence on board processes and socio-psychological research on 
small-group dynamics have supported the argument that diverse boards are 
associated with better decision-making and governance.114 The basic premise of 
these arguments is that diversity—whether through representation of different 
strengths, consideration of different concerns, or questions based on varying life 
                                                                                                                 
 
than conclusive”); see also VIRTCOM CONSULTING, BOARD DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY: 
REALIZING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 4–5 (2009). 
 110.  See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 108, at 308 (discussing the lack of a causal link); 
EASTMAN ET AL., supra note 100 (discussing the MSCI studies). 
 111. See VIRTCOM CONSULTING, supra note 109, at 10. The Virtcom Consulting study 
shows that over a five-year period, diverse boards outperformed the NASDAQ 100 and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average but failed to outperform the Standard & Poor’s 500. Id. Because 
the NASDAQ 100 and Dow Jones incorporate only some of the largest firms, it begs the 
question of how to establish the proper benchmark for analyzing gender diversity. 
Additionally, it raises the issue of properly segmenting the different types of companies 
between diverse and not diverse. 
 112. See, e.g., Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 109. Albeit this is perhaps due to the 
need for boards to dip into younger, less-qualified talent pools for the same number of women. 
See Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm 
Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 137, 188 (2012). 
 113. See DHIR, supra note 20, at 64–68; Rhode & Packel supra note 82, at 390–93. 
 114. See Vicki W. Kramer, Alison M. Konrad & Sumru Erkut, Critical Mass on Corporate 
Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance 8–9 (Wellesley Ctrs. For Women, 
Working Paper No. 11, 2006). But cf. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF 
DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 324–35 (2007); Lynne 
L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002) (explaining that “heterogeneous groups do not necessarily have an 
advantage over homogeneous groups when the task is solving problems that have verifiably, 
correct answers”); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and 
Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 
814–15 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71, 111–12 (2000). 
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experiences—will counteract groupthink.115 Indeed, there has been a growing body 
of evidence that diversity on boards is associated with improved governance.116  
Some legal studies have also attempted to quantify the personal impact of gender 
diversity within the boardroom through interviews with former corporate 
directors.117 Through these studies, scholars have noted two almost unanimous 
observations. First, directors believe that board diversity is important and boards 
should attempt to improve diversity.118 Second, when pressed for tangible examples 
of how gender diversity made a difference, respondents struggled to provide 
responses.119 These findings further crystalize the difficulty in directly attributing the 
benefits of diversity.  
Finally, gender diversity can have a positive impact on the monitoring role of the 
board.120 According to a study of the Norwegian quota regime, female directors tend 
to bring to the boardroom a more vigilant and probing approach, and women “may 
be particularly adept at critically questioning, guiding, and advising management 
without disrupting the overall working relationship between the board and 
management.”121 Similarly, a study of Israeli boards found that “[b]oards with at least 
3 directors of each gender are found to be at least 79% more active at board meetings 
than those without such representation” and that “[g]ender-balanced boards are also 
more likely to replace underperforming chief executive officers (CEOs) and are 
particularly active during periods when CEOs are being replaced.”122 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. For example, studies have found evidence that women are more financially risk 
averse, more trustworthy, and more collaborative. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982) 
(defining groupthink as a phenomenon in which members’ efforts to achieve consensus can 
override their ability to “realistically appraise alternative courses of action”); see also Marleen 
A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306–08 
(2003) (discussing how diversity on corporate boards can discourage groupthink). 
 116. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 393–401; see also Adams & Ferreira, supra 
note 108, at 304 (finding that firms with higher proportions of female directors hold more 
meetings, have higher attendance rates, greater participation in decision making, engage in 
tougher monitoring, and are more likely to replace a CEO after poor stock performance); 
Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline, supra note 83, at 589–95; Sandeep Gopalan & Katherine 
Watson, An Agency Theoretical Approach to Corporate Board Diversity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2015) (“Some of the most persuasive evidence about the ability of diverse boards 
to improve firm performance concerns the role of the board in monitoring management.”); 
Rosenblum & Roithmayr, supra note 109, 927–28. 
 117. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley & Lissa L. Broome, Diversity and Talent 
at the Top: Lessons from the Boardroom, in DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE: RACE, GENDER, AND 
CLASS IN LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL CAREERS 81 (Spencer Headworth et al. eds., 2016). 
 118. However, the study did note one adamant dissenter. Id. at 82.  
 119. Id.; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, John M. Conley & Lissa L. Broome, The Danger 
of Difference: Tensions in Directors’ View of Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
919, 920 (2013). 
 120. DHIR, supra note 20, at 35. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Gender and Board Activeness: The Role of a Critical Mass, 52 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 751, 751 (2017).  
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In sum, moral and social reasons, corporate finance justifications, and corporate 
governance findings have all been raised to support the case for more gender 
diversity in boards.  
D. The Missing Dimension: Substantive Gender Diversity  
Academic and public discourse has too often focused on the idea of achieving 
some minimum representation of women—sometimes as few as one.123 Yet, 
increasing the number of women on boards is only a partial step in the achievement 
of a truly gender-diverse board. A truly diverse board gives women more than a seat 
at the table—it grants them the ability to have a voice and an impact. Therefore, 
academic and public discourse must also examine whether the roles that women are 
tasked with as directors afford them equal opportunity to make an impact. 
The answer to this question requires a deeper, truer measure of gender equity. It 
is also central to both strands of gender diversity justifications, as it is a key 
component in the case they each make for advancing gender diversity. Indeed, as 
explained below, substantive gender diversity matters whether you believe that 
gender diverse boards perform better or whether you believe that women are entitled 
to equal treatment. 
Clearly, if the motivation for better gender diversity on boards is rooted in the 
antidiscrimination notion, then ensuring equal treatment within the boardroom is as 
important a goal as ensuring that women get better representation on boards. If 
women are denied an equal voice and are shunned from leadership roles, they are 
denied equal treatment.  
Advocates of the instrumental case for gender diversity must also turn their focus 
to the question of substantive gender diversity. If the presence of women on boards 
improves corporate performance, in its narrow or broader sense, then we must gain 
insight with respect to the ability of women to truly influence and transform the way 
boards work. Acknowledging the instrumental value that gender diversity brings to 
the board must necessarily also lead to an examination of the ways through which 
women are able to contribute to the board’s work. 
It is, therefore, imperative that gender diversity discourse turn its attention to the 
question of substantive diversity. Whether advocating for gender diversity out of a 
social cause agenda or due to the belief that diversity improves the board’s work and 
therefore company performance, substantive diversity in the boardroom is an 
important dimension in ensuring such goals. Importantly, this Article does not stake 
a claim regarding the proper justification for gender diversity on boards. Rather, 
given the existing push for gender diversity, the Article underscores the import of the 
substantive data on gender diversity for current gender diversity discourse. 
Despite the importance of substantive gender diversity, investors, regulators, and 
academic discourse have left this dimension unattended, focusing on the quantitative 
dimension instead. Redirecting the attention of gender diversity discourse to this 
important facet is the first goal of this Article.  
But recognizing the value of substantive gender diversity also means that we need 
to know more on the current picture of the substantive diversity of boards in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
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United States. Furthermore, if differences do exist, we need to know why, and we 
need to understand the costs that these differences might cause. In the next Part, this 
Article takes a first step in informing the current academic discourse with novel 
findings regarding substantive gender diversity in boardrooms.  
II. GENDER DIVERSITY–EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This Part provides insight into the question of substantive diversity on boards by 
examining the substance of female directors’ participation on boards relative to their 
male peers, as well as over time.  
This study examines the S&P 1500 companies during the years 2007 to 2015.124 
Because the study spans multiple years, some companies moved into the index while 
other companies moved out.125 Thus, 1868 individual companies appear at least once 
throughout the sample period.126 The data for this sample was originally compiled 
from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) and was subsequently augmented 
with data from Bloomberg, FactSet, and Equilar BoardEdge.127 On average, there 
were 13,872 directors in each data year with an average of 11,980 male and 1892 
female directors.128 Both descriptive statistics as well as regression models were used 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. The complete data file is with the author. Based on the data, the regression models 
analyzed the impact of year, market capitalization, age of the company, and industries on the 
dependent variables. This study looked at the timeframe spanning 2007 to 2015, providing the 
ability to measure the change of any given variable throughout the study period. Market 
capitalization was measured in thousands of dollars as reported at the end of the calendar year. 
While each index represents a proxy for the size of any given company, market cap allows an 
evaluation on the size of a company on each variable. The age of the company was measured 
in years from the founding of the company. While the year provides information regarding the 
change in a given dependent variable, the age of the company attempts to look at the 
differences between older and newer companies. Finally, to limit the number of industries, the 
data were limited to the following classifications: Consumer Services, Electronic Technology, 
Finance, Industrial Services, Retail Trade, Technology Services, Utilities, and Other. The 
“Other” variable includes all companies within the study not included in any of the other 
industries and is the reference or baseline category in the multivariate regression models. 
 125. The S&P U.S. Indices are a family of equity indices designed to measure the market 
performance of U.S. stocks trading on U.S. exchanges. The family is composed of a wide 
range of indices based on size, sector, and style. The indices are weighted by float-adjusted 
market capitalization and require unadjusted company market capitalization of US$6.1 billion 
or more for the S&P 500, $1.6 billion to $6.8 billion for the S&P MidCap 400, and $450 
million to $2.1 billion for the S&P SmallCap 600. These ranges are reviewed from time to 
time to assure consistency with market conditions. See S&P Composite 1500, S&P DOW JONES 
INDICES, https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-composite-1500 [https://perma.cc/KL3Z 
-GSPZ]. 
 126. The ISS director data file within the WRDS database contains various statistics on 
directors in public companies in the United States. See About, WHARTON, UNIV. PA., 
https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/about [https://perma.cc/J8WS-ESZR]. 
 127. Available data for each director: Data Year; Date Started; Age; Total Number of Male 
& Female Directors; Number of Other Directorships; Company Industry; Market 
Capitalization; Title within the Company (if applicable); and whether the director was on the 
Audit, Compensation, Corporate Governance, or Nominating Committee. See id. 
 128. Id.  
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in this study. The former provides insight into absolute and relative numbers whereas 
the latter shows how certain numbers or levels are impacted by other variables. 
This Part begins with a presentation of the empirical findings regarding 
quantitative and substantive gender diversity in Sections A and B, respectively. 
Section C then ties the results together, underscoring the key lessons that can be 
derived from the findings.  
A. Quantitative Gender Diversity 
As a first step, this Section follows the prevalent “quantitative” approach to 
gender diversity, examining the current ratios and percentages of women on S&P 
1500 companies’ boards, both across different companies and over time. These 
quantitative results are an important foundation, setting the stage for the substantive 
analysis that the study centers on in the following Section.  
Overall, the S&P 1500 followed a similar trend to the one seen in other indices 
with respect to the gender composition of boards. As a whole, the percentage of 
female directors on boards has increased from 11.9% in 2007 to 16.5% in 2015. At 
the start of the study, the ratio of men to women was 7.4:1. This ratio decreased to 
5.07:1 in 2015.  
While during the study period more men were added to corporate boards than 
women, the rate of adding women to boards has increased over time. The retail 
industry has the top gender parity with 19.2% of directorships represented by women. 
On the other hand, Industrial Services and Electronic Technology lag behind other 
industries with only 7.7% and 8.9%, respectively, of total female board participation. 
Figure 1: Percentage of Female Board Directors  
in the S&P 1500 by Year (2007–2015) 
 
 
Table 1 presents regression results of the percentage of women on boards on 
several independent variables. The percentage of women increased on average by .5 
percentage points for every additional year of the study. Additionally, the size of a 
company is positively correlated with better boardroom gender parity. That is, for 
every one-million-dollar increase in a company’s market capitalization, the 
percentage of women on a board increased by .5 percentage points. Finally, older 
11.9% 12.3% 13.1% 14.5% 16.5%
88.1% 87.7% 86.9% 85.5% 83.5%
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Female Male
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companies tend to have more women relative to their younger counterparts. For each 
additional year since formation, the percentage of women on a given board increased 
by .04 percentage points.  
Table 1: Regression Results 
 Average Female Ratio Female Ratio 
Year (2007 = Year 0) 4.1 .005*** .005*** 
Market Cap (in thousands of $) 10112.34 4.54 x 10-7*** 4.67 x 10-7*** 
Age of Company (years) 17.02 .0005*** .0004*** 
Consumer Services (industry) .149  .021*** 
Electronic Technology (industry) .089  -.039*** 
Finance (industry) .133  .006** 
Industrial Services (industry) .077  -.050*** 
Retail Trade (industry) .192  .051*** 
Technology Services (industry) .105  -.026*** 
Utilities (industry) .191***  .058*** 
Constant   .095*** .096*** 
N 12,167 12,167 12,167 
R2  .0549 .1152 
Table 1: This Table presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the 
dependent variable is female board percentage. The first column presents the averages for each 
independent variable. Industry averages are proportions. The second column presents OLS results for 
Year, Market Cap, and Age. The third column presents regression results after accounting for industry. 
*** (**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels.  
 
These results confirm the conclusions of previous studies, showing a general trend 
towards increased board gender diversity, at least as measured by the ratio of men to 
women. Importantly, the results also highlight that significant differences between 
companies exist, depending on industry, size, and age of the company. These 
differences are often underexplored in current scholarship.  
B. Substantive Gender Diversity 
This Section starts where prior studies have ended, examining a set of substantive 
measures of gender diversity in the boardroom. These variables are important factors 
when determining the level of parity that female directors enjoy.  
By examining all available information from the compiled data regarding the age, 
tenure, leadership roles, service on other boards and specific workload, and 
responsibilities within the boardroom, this Section sheds light on observed 
differences between male and female directors. Importantly, while many unobserved 
dynamics may influence board parity, this study has narrowly focused on observable 
metrics. In part, the focus stems from lack of available data regarding unobserved 
board dynamics. Yet, it is also shaped by the practical need for measurable 
substantive variables that can be easily and neutrally collected and compared.  
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1. Tenure 
Director tenure has become an important factor in corporate governance.129 Yet, 
while most studies look at director tenure as a whole, the relative tenure of men and 
women could be important in the context of substantive gender diversity. If 
companies appoint more women but retain them for shorter tenures than their male 
counterparts, this could counteract the increased representation of women on the 
board. Particularly, shorter tenure may limit the ability of a director to gain clout 
within the boardroom, and the company, and marginalize her vis-à-vis the longer 
tenured male directors in the room. If men and women have significant and 
systematic differences in their tenure, a concern may arise as to the true level of 
substantive equality in the boardroom.  
As shown in Table 2, the data indeed reveals systemic differences in the tenure of 
men and women. In total, men had an average tenure of between 1.99 (22%) and 2.64 
(27%) years longer than women. This overall disparity is more than a byproduct of 
recent board appointments for more women as it has persisted over time, across 
measures of industry and market size.130  
Table 2: Average Tenure Length by Gender and Year (2007–2015) 
 
 
In 2007, women had an average tenure of 6.87 years. This number increased to 
7.8 years in 2012, but subsequently fell to 7.42 in 2015. Men, on the other hand, had 
an average tenure of approximately 10 years from 2012 to 2016. Figure 2 shows that 
differences between men and women are even starker as one moves from the S&P 
500 (large-cap companies) to the S&P 400 (mid-cap) and subsequently to the S&P 
600 (small-cap). The difference in 2015 between men and women for the S&P 500 
was 1.94 years (9.61 years versus 7.67 years). In the S&P 400 and S&P 600, the 
differences were 3.06 years (10.27 versus 7.21) and 3.15 years (10.36 versus 7.21) 
respectively. This suggests that the gap between men and women is much closer in 
larger companies. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. See Nili, supra note 52 (discussing the impact of director tenure on corporate 
governance).  
 130. Importantly, the median tenure of women is two years lower than that of men, even 
during the last few years. The standard deviation of the tenure of women has also not changed 
dramatically, reducing the concern that the disparity is driven by the recent influx of women 
to boardrooms.  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Female 6.87 7.14 7.48 7.60 7.73 7.80 7.79 7.67 7.42 
Male 9.22 9.38 9.47 9.67 9.84 10.03 10.04 10.06 10.06 
Difference 2.35 2.24 1.99 2.07 2.12 2.23 2.25 2.39 2.64 
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Figure 2: Gap in Average Tenure of Male vs. Female Board Members 
 
Looking at the difference in the tenure of female directors across industries, 
Utilities had the longest tenured women at an average of 8.39 years of service. 
Technology Services represents the shortest average tenure of female directors with 
an average of only 5.57 years of service. According to the regression results 
displayed in Table 3, even after controlling for age of the company under the 
assumption that companies in the Utilities Industry are older than Technology 
Services, these two industries remained at the extremes of the tenure spectrum. 
Table 3: Regression Results 
 Average 
Female 
Tenure Length 
Female 
Tenure Length 
Year (2007 = Year 0) 4.26 .035* .039** 
Market Cap (in thousands of $) 12733.04 5.73 x 10-7 1.5 x 10-6 
Age of Company (years) 18.6 .034*** .034*** 
Consumer Services (industry) 7.419  -.221 
Electronic Technology (industry) 6.597  -1.167*** 
Finance (industry) 7.681  .135 
Industrial Services (industry) 6.472  -1.193*** 
Retail Trade (industry) 7.230  -.566*** 
Technology Services (industry) 5.570  -2.122*** 
Utilities (industry) 8.397  .180 
Constant  6.70*** 6.929*** 
N  9,038 9,038 
R2  .0216 .0354 
Table 3: This Table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is female tenure 
length. The first column presents averages for each independent variable. The second column presents 
OLS results for Year, Market Cap, and Age. The third column presents results after accounting for 
industry. *** (**,*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
S&P 500 1.47 1.44 1.24 1.22 1.23 1.3 1.42 1.68 1.94
S&P 400 2.46 2.31 2.22 2.43 2.41 2.36 2.4 2.58 3.06
S&P 600 3.45 3.19 2.79 2.85 3 3.26 3.11 3.12 3.15
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
M
al
e/
F
em
al
e 
G
ap
 (
in
 y
ea
rs
)
170 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:145 
 
2. Age  
Age disparity between groups of directors might affect different boards in various 
ways. In some cases, boards may enjoy the added level of age heterogeneity while in 
others age disparity may be a cause of friction. Figure 3 presents the observed 
information regarding the gender and age disparity. Until 2015, when the average 
age of women serving on corporate boards decreased (likely due to the increased 
additions of women), the average age of directors of both genders steadily increased 
throughout the study period. On average, male directors tended to be older than their 
female counterparts. In 2007, the difference between men and women was 4.38 years 
(61.86 versus 57.48). This difference shrank substantially to 2.49 years in 2014, but 
rose again in 2015. As of 2015 male directors were on average 64 years old while 
female directors were, on average, 60.51 years old. Looking at women individually, 
the average director was older in the large cap companies, but little difference exists 
between mid- and small-cap stocks. 
Figure 3: Average Age of Directors by Gender and Year (2007–2015) 
 
3. Chair Positions 
A key indicator for influence in the boardroom is the position of the chair of the 
board. As chair, a director has control of the board’s agenda in addition to other 
formal and informal powers.131 While in many companies the CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board, recent trends have led to a separation of these roles with 
many companies appointing independent directors as board chair.132  
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. For a discussion of the chair’s role, see, for example, Stanislav Shekshnia, How to Be 
a Good Board Chair, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/03/how-to-be-
a-good-board-chair [https://perma.cc/ECM2-YWBD]. 
 132. See Ryan Krause, Mike Withers & Matthew Semadeni, Sharing the Lead: Examining 
the Causes and Consequences of Lead Independent Director Appointment, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2017/09/20/sharing-the-lead-examining-the-causes-and-consequences-of-lead-independent-
director-appointment [https://perma.cc/9E5N-VLQL]. 
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Examining the ratio of men to women as non-CEO chairs of boards,133 while 
controlling for their relative size, the data show a significant disparity between 
female and male directors. First, in absolute numbers the differences are striking. In 
2015, there were only 27 female directors who served as chair compared to 769 
males. As a ratio of the total number of directors, the disparity is still striking. 
Women serving as chairwoman were only 1% out of the entire female director 
sample, while men were six times more likely to serve as chairman, standing at 6.5% 
of the male director sample.134 
4. Lead Independent Director Role 
When the CEO also serves as the chair of the board, or when the chair is not an 
independent director, many companies name a “lead independent director.” This 
director has a leadership role among the independent directors on the board and often 
serves as counterweight to the CEO/Chair.135 Examining the ratio of men to women 
serving as lead independent directors, while controlling for their relative size, the 
data, again, show significant disparity between the genders. In 2015, only 57 female 
directors served as lead independent directors compared to 539 males. As a ratio of 
the respective total number of directors, women serving as lead independent directors 
were only 3.6% out of the entire female director sample, while men were more than 
two times more likely to serve as lead directors, standing at 7.4% of the male sample.  
Table 4: Lead Independent Director Role  
 
# Female Lead 
Independent 
Directors 
% of Entire 
Sample 
% of Female 
Directors 
# Male Lead 
Independent 
Directors 
% of 
Entire 
Sample 
% of Male 
Directors 
Total 
Directors 
2010 28 0.39% 2.73% 434 6.08% 7.09% 7143 
2011 39 0.50% 3.38% 492 6.33% 7.43% 7777 
2012 43 0.54% 3.51% 516 6.45% 7.61% 8002 
2013 44 0.52% 3.30% 521 6.21% 7.39% 8384 
2014 49 0.57% 3.40% 534 6.18% 7.42% 8639 
2015 57 0.65% 3.64% 539 6.10% 7.42% 8833 
 
Some may argue that the gap in leadership roles may be explained by the fact that 
women have yet to achieve sufficient tenure, especially due to the increased addition 
of women to boards in recent years. Therefore, as their tenure increases in the next 
5–10 years so would their leadership representation. The data contradicts this line of 
reasoning. First, as discussed above, the tenure gap is not merely a result of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. To prevent skewing of the results by the subset of chairs who are also CEOs (and are 
overwhelmingly men), the study only examined chair roles held by independent directors.  
 134. Similarly, according to a recent Equilar report, in 2016, only 7.6% of nonexecutive 
chair, CEO/Chair, or lead director roles were occupied by women. Boardroom Indicator: 
18.9%, EQUILAR (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.equilar.com/blogs/bi/10-27-2016-boardroom-
indicator-18.9.html [https://perma.cc/5LRD-22CX]. 
 135. See Krause et. al., supra note 132 (“[M]any have argued that the CEO and chair 
positions must be separated to prevent the conflict of interest inherent to the CEO leading the 
board.”).  
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addition of women in greater numbers.136 Second, when examining the leadership 
percentages of each gender, the gap is not a function of tenure. According to the 
results displayed in Table 5, the data shows consistent gaps in leadership likelihood 
even after controlling for tenure. In each of the four tenure quartiles, women lag men 
in their likelihood to take the role of chair or lead independent director. 
 
Table 5: Leadership Roles and Tenure 
 
5. Service on Other Boards 
One of the criteria in looking for new directors is prior experience.137 With fewer 
women holding existing directorship experience, these women might be more likely 
to serve on multiple boards. In other words, with a smaller potential pool of 
candidates, boards may be tapping the same women to fill diversity initiatives, 
instead of expanding the pool altogether. The data presented in Figure 4 support this 
argument. The average number of boards on which female directors sit on has 
remained relatively constant throughout the time period starting at 1.97 boards in 
2007 to 1.95 boards in 2015. For men, however, the average number of boards has 
decreased from 1.88 to 1.78 over the same period.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. See supra Section II.B.1.  
 137. Renée B. Adams, Ali C. Akyol & Patrick Verwijmeren, Director Skill Sets 44 (Mar. 
31, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2365748 [https://perma.cc/MD8C-VGR9] (finding that 13% of nominating committees 
specifically list outside board experience as a requisite qualification for inclusion as a 
nominee). 
 Leadership Role Likelihood (as a percentage of the respective sample)  
0–4 Years of 
Tenure 
4–8 Years of 
Tenure 
8–12 Years of 
Tenure 
12+ Years of 
Tenure  
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
2007 0.63% 2.12% 0.75% 2.19% 0.50% 1.78% 0.31% 4.11% 
2008 0.88% 2.80% 0.82% 3.09% 0.65% 2.24% 0.59% 4.74% 
2009 0.99% 2.43% 1.16% 2.93% 0.87% 2.39% 0.58% 5.19% 
2010 1.00% 2.30% 0.94% 3.36% 0.94% 2.92% 1.11% 6.24% 
2011 0.49% 0.91% 0.76% 2.33% 0.87% 2.56% 1.25% 5.89% 
2012 0.47% 0.90% 0.63% 2.18% 0.94% 2.72% 1.41% 6.14% 
2013 0.49% 0.91% 0.69% 2.20% 0.89% 2.48% 1.28% 6.32% 
2014 0.37% 1.02% 0.56% 2.16% 1.02% 2.44% 1.44% 6.16% 
2015 0.35% 1.28% 0.62% 1.84% 0.88% 2.30% 1.71% 6.09% 
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Figure 4: Average Number of Boards Directors  
Sit On by Gender and Year (2007–2015) 
 
 
 Table 6 breaks out this information by S&P index. Looking across the indices, on 
average, the smaller cap stocks have fewer “busy” or “overboarded directors.”138 
That is, both men and women are less likely to serve on multiple boards in smaller 
cap indices. Further, the gap between the number of boards each gender sits on 
shrinks when moving from the S&P 500 to the S&P 600. For example, in 2015 the 
difference in average number of boards between women and men in S&P 500 
companies was .15 boards whereas in the S&P 600 the difference was only .06 
boards. 
Table 6: Average Number of Boards Directors  
Sit On by Gender, Year, and Index (2007–2015) 
  2007 2010 2012 2015 
S&P 500 Female 2.25 2.16 2.09 2.18 
Male 2.17 2.06 2.03 2.03 
S&P 400 Female 1.82 1.76 1.87 1.93 
Male 1.87 1.77 1.75 1.75 
S&P 600 Female 1.64 1.56 1.58 1.61 
Male 1.62 1.58 1.56 1.55 
6. Service on Board Committees 
What roles do women and men hold on the various key committees139 in the 
boardroom? Examining the membership on specific board committees provides a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. “Busy Directors” are characterized as individuals who serve on multiple boards. This 
term generally has a negative connotation in that busy directors spend so much time on 
different boards that they are unable to devote their full time to any given board. Evidence of 
directors after mergers suggests that busy directors are associated with worse corporate 
performance and lower earnings. See May Hu & Pei Ni Huynh, How Do Cross-Border 
Mergers and Acquisitions Affect Firms’ Management and Stakeholders? Part 2, 20 CORP. FIN. 
REV. 13, 21 (2015). 
 139. These are the Audit, Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Nominating 
committees. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
1.97 1.97 1.95 1.90 1.88 1.89 1.92 1.94
1.95
1.88 1.87 1.83 1.81 1.81 1.78 1.79 1.79 1.78
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
2.20
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Female Male
174 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:145 
 
more accurate picture of each director’s role on the board and the impact they may 
have on the corporation.140 This substantive aspect can enable us to better detect 
whether women are equal partners on the board, whether women are relegated to a 
secondary role within the boardroom, or whether women take an increased workload 
due to their lower numbers. 
a. Average Number of Committees 
Throughout the entire sample period, women sat on between .25 (2009) and .20 
(2014) more board committees than their male counterparts. This suggests that 
female directors have an increased workload on the board as compared to male 
directors.  
Figure 5: Average Number of Committees per Board  
Directors by Gender and Year (2007–2015) 
 
 
b. Percent of Men and Women on At Least One Board Committee 
Because directors sitting on more than two board committees can skew the 
average number of committees higher, looking at the relative pools of directors who 
sit on more than one board can help confirm the conclusions of the previous Section. 
Figure 6 presents the data. In 2015, 84% of women directors compared to 71% of 
men directors served on at least one committee.141 Thus, female directors outpace 
their male counterparts, both in terms of average committees and involvement on at 
least one committee. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. See Klein, supra note 53.  
 141. This percentage point difference existed in three of the sample years where in the 
other six years the difference was fourteen percentage points. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Men and Women on At Least  
One Committee by Year (2007–2015) 
 
c. Likelihood of Sitting on a Given Number of Committees 
Men are much more likely to participate on zero committees while women are 
more likely to participate on one, two, or three committees throughout the sample 
period. A woman had a 31% chance of sitting on three committees, 19% chance of 
sitting on two committees, and 29% chance of sitting on one committee. A man, on 
the other hand, had a 25% chance of sitting on three committees, 18% chance of 
sitting on two committees, and 23% chance of sitting on one committee. 
Accordingly, women directors seem to be tasked with more committee work than 
their male counterparts are. Table 8 breaks down the percentages of female board 
directors by industry and number of committees.142 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. Table 8 statistical results are from a univariate regression model used to break down 
the averages from Table 7 by industry. Unless otherwise noted, the average of each industry 
was statistically significantly different from the average of the rest of the sample at the 5% 
level. The average likelihood for women to sit on zero committees was 13%. Given a female 
that was in Consumer Services, that likelihood rose to 20.5%, while for Industrial Services 
that likelihood declined to 10.4%. The average likelihood for any given female director to sit 
on one committee was 30%. If a given female was on Technology Services, that likelihood 
rose to 33.7%, however for Consumer Services that likelihood declined to 22.6%. The average 
likelihood of a female sitting on two committees across all industries was 20%. If that female 
was on a Consumer Services board, the likelihood was 29.1% whereas an Industrial Services 
female board member had a 15.2% chance of being on two committees. Next, the average 
likelihood for a female to sit on three committees is 32%. At the top end, if a female is on a 
Retail Trade board, the likelihood rises to 35.9% and on the low end a female on a Consumer 
Services board has a 25.3% chance of sitting on three committees. Finally, the likelihood for 
a female to sit on four committees is 5%. Again, a female on a Consumer Services board only 
has a 2.6% chance of sitting on four committees while a female on an Industrial Services board 
has an 8% chance of the same. 
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Table 7: Percent of Directors Participating on Multiple  
Committees by Number of Committees and Gender 
 Zero One Two Three Four 
Female 16% 29% 19% 31% 5% 
Male 28% 23% 18% 25% 6% 
Table 8: Percent of Female Board Directors Participating on  
Multiple Committees by Number of Committees and Industry 
Industry Zero One Two Three Four 
Consumer 
Services 
.205*** .226*** .291*** .253*** .026*** 
Electronic 
Technology 
.129 .315 .168*** .346* .042 
Finance .155*** .320*** .174*** .281*** .069*** 
Industrial 
Services 
.104 .332 .152** .332 .080** 
Retail Trade .155** .238*** .174*** .359*** .074** 
Technology 
Services 
.124 .337** .207 .299 .033** 
Utilities .111 .302 .224 .325 .038* 
Average .13 .3 .2 .32 .05 
Difference 
from Largest 
to Smallest 
.101 .111 .139 .106 .054 
Table 8: Statistical significance determined using univariate regression. *** (**,*) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels. 
 
Next, the analysis examined the likelihood that an individual director sits on a 
specific number of board committees (ranging from zero to four).143 The regression 
results are presented in Table 9. For example, all coefficients for Female are positive, 
suggesting that being a female has a stronger influence on serving on one or more 
committees than it does on serving on zero committees. Being a female has the 
strongest effect for serving on three committees. The effect of age increases as we 
move from zero to four committees. Industry type also matters at times. For example, 
Industrial Services directors are more likely to serve on four committees than on zero 
committees. For other industries, directors are less likely to serve on more 
committees.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. The process of estimating the likelihood took three steps. First, a multinomial logistic 
regression analysis was used to model the number of committees a board member participated 
on as a function of the director’s gender, age, and the industry of company (a multinomial 
logistic regression is preferred when the dependent variable consists of multiple, related binary 
categories. Here the dependent variable is whether a director served on zero, one, two, three, 
or four committees). Next, a number of hypothetical scenarios were created. Finally, 
coefficients from the regression analysis were used to estimate the probability of a member 
serving on specified numbers of committees for each scenario. 
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Table 9: Regression Results 
 One 
Committee 
Two 
Committees 
Three 
Committees 
Four 
Committees 
Female 0.951*** 0.866*** 1.027*** 0.623*** 
Company Age 0.033*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.079*** 
Consumer Services (industry) -0.271** -0.255* -0.403*** -0.985*** 
Electronic Technology 
(industry) 
-0.077 -0.199** -0.130 -0.147 
Finance (industry)  -0.229*** -0.316*** -0.405*** 0.002 
Industrial Services (industry) -0.263 -0.209 -0.231 0.521*** 
Retail Trade (industry) -0.205* -0.489*** -0.289*** 0.047 
Technology Services 
(industry) 
-0.011 -0.157 -0.181 -0.054 
Utilities (industry) 0.180 0.050 -0.065 -0.245 
Constant -2.176*** -3.664*** -3.726*** -6.634*** 
N 12,432 
AIC 37135 
Table 9: This Table presents results from a multinomial logistical regression where the dependent variable 
is whether the director served on zero, one, two, three, or four committees. *** (**,*) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels. The zero committee category is the reference category, so 
coefficients are relative to their estimated influence on serving on zero committees. 
d. Likelihood of Sitting on a Given Committee 
One potential gender parity concern is that women may be excluded from specific 
important board committees. The descriptive statistics in Table 10 mostly alleviate 
such a concern as women are serving in large numbers on all of the key board 
committees.144 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. Unless otherwise indicated, the differences between industries were statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 10: Percent of Board Directors that Are Female  
in Each Industry of Each Committee Type 
Industry Nominating Corporate 
Governance 
Compensation Audit 
Consumer Services .421*** .418*** .448 .384*** 
Electronic Technology .47 .47 .453 .464 
Finance .45*** .442*** .407*** .488*** 
Industrial Services .477 .477 .496** .501* 
Retail Trade .509 .508 .472** .468 
Technology Services .46 .451 .42 .48 
Utilities .479 .474 .458 .464 
Average .49 .48 .44 .46 
Difference from Largest 
to Smallest 
.088 .09 .089 .094 
Table 10: Statistical significance determined using univariate regression. *** (**,*) indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels. 
 
Following these descriptive statistics, the study modeled whether an individual is 
on each of the four committees using a logistic regression.145 The independent 
variables remain Age, Gender, and Industry. The results of the four logistic 
regressions are displayed in Table 11.146 Females are more likely than their male 
colleagues to serve on the Corporate Governance and Compensation committees and 
less likely than males to serve on the Audit Committee after controlling for Age and 
Industry. When it comes to serving on these specific committees, however, there is 
little variation by industry. The lone exception is that individuals in the Retail Trade 
industry are slightly less likely to serve on the Corporate Governance Committee 
than those in other industries. Older individuals are more likely to serve on the 
Corporate Governance Committee while younger individuals are less likely to serve 
on the Audit Committee. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. A logistic regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is a single binary 
outcome. 
 146. The few individuals serving on nominating committees make the coefficient estimates 
for this regression highly uncertain. 
2019] BEYOND THE NUMBERS  179 
 
Table 11: Regression Results 
 Nominating 
Committee 
Corporate 
Governance 
Committee 
Compensation 
Committee 
Audit 
Committee 
Female -1.037 0.254*** 0.128** -0.214*** 
Company Age  0.041 0.012*** 0.004 -0.008*** 
Consumer 
Services (industry) 
-16.223 0.152 0.039 -0.091 
Electronic 
Technology 
(industry) 
0.102 -0.077 -0.010 0.038 
Finance (industry) 0.435 0.028 -0.073 0.049 
Industrial Services 
(industry) 
-16.359 -0.199 -0.028 0.106 
Retail Trade 
(industry) 
-16.194 -0.284* 0.000 0.107 
Technology 
Services (industry) 
-16.197 -0.039 0.012 0.011 
Utilities (industry) -16.263 0.168 -0.019 -0.046 
Constant -8.857*** -2.939*** -0.938*** 0.783*** 
N 16 995 3049 5122 
AIC 243 6299 11685 12601 
Table 11: This Table presents results from four separate logistic regressions where the dependent variables 
are whether the director served on the Nominating, Corporate Governance, Compensation, or Audit 
Committees. *** (**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) levels. 
e. Committee Chair Position 
As shown in Part II.B.4, board leadership positions tilt heavily in favor of male 
directors. Looking at leadership at the board committee level, the Article finds that 
female directors are also underrepresented in board committee leadership. Yet, there 
has been a steady improvement in female committee leadership over time. Table 12 
below illustrates the improvement in the percentage of female committee chairs over 
time while also showing that the ratio of women chairs still lags behind their relative 
representation on these committees. For instance, while in 2007 only 7% of Audit 
Committee chairs in the sample were women (102 directors), that ratio doubled to 
14% in 2015 (210 directors). However, in both years the percentage of Audit 
Committee members that were women was significantly higher compared to their 
committee chair representation. In 2007, 12% of the Audit Committee members were 
women while only 7% served as chairs, and in 2015, 18% of the Audit Committee 
members were women with only 14% serving as chairs. These disparities are 
statistically significant and hold across committees and over time.  
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Table 12: Comparison of Committee Chair Position  
Year Nomination 
Committee 
Governance 
Committee 
Compensation 
Committee 
Audit 
Committee 
Any 
Committee 
2007 
.12/.13* 
(164/737) 
.12/.14* 
(162/734) 
.08/.12* 
(120/658) 
.07/.12* 
(102/698) 
.11/.13* 
(446/1342) 
2008 
.12/.14* 
(171/814) 
.12/.14* 
(167/812) 
.10/.12* 
(139/708) 
.08/.13* 
(118/739) 
.11/.14* 
(477/1456) 
2009 
.12/.14* 
(173/823) 
.12/.14* 
(170/822) 
.09/.13* 
(138/740) 
.09/.13* 
(134/753) 
.11/.14* 
(481/1481) 
2010 
.13/.14* 
(183/839) 
.13/.14* 
(179/832) 
.10/.13* 
(151/772) 
.10/.13* 
(142/769) 
.12/.14* 
(513/1531) 
2011 
.14/.15* 
(197/852) 
.14/.15* 
(195/850) 
.10/.13* 
(153/753) 
.10/.14* 
(154/800) 
.13/.14* 
(545/1552) 
2012 
.13/.15* 
(197/891) 
.13/.16* 
(195/885) 
.11/.14* 
(165/806) 
.12/.14* 
(174/852) 
.13/.15* 
(557/1655) 
2013 
.15/.16* 
(225/949) 
.15/.16* 
(224/945) 
.12/.15* 
(175/855) 
.12/.15* 
(187/929) 
.14/.16* 
(624/1764) 
2014 
.16/.17 
(235/1002) 
.16/.17 
(236/994) 
.13/.16* 
(187/924) 
.14/.17* 
(211/968) 
.15/.17* 
(658/1855) 
2015 
.16/.19* 
(241/1070) 
.16/.19* 
(239/1063) 
.14/.17* 
(204/973) 
.14/.18* 
(210/1030) 
.15/.18* 
(684/1964) 
Table 12: This Table presents the percentage of female committee chairs compared to their ratio on the 
committee. The first number in each cell is the proportion of companies with a female chair on a given 
committee and year. The second number is the average proportion of female directors on a given 
committee and year for all companies in the data. The star indicates that the second number in a cell is 
statistically distinguishable from the first. The first number in the parentheses is the raw number of female 
chairs and the second number is the raw number of female directors on these committees.  
C. Key Lessons from the Findings  
Several broad observations can be drawn from the empirical findings. First, it is 
clear that important differences exist between genders not only in the quantitative 
numbers of each gender in the boardroom but also in the substantive characteristics 
and roles within the boardroom that each gender is more likely to hold.  
Second, the data show that differences between genders vary both across different 
industries and across market cap sizes. These differences highlight the need to 
examine companies on an individual level, rather than through an aggregate ratio, for 
a true and more complete assessment of the gender parity on boards. The variation 
the data show is also important for future academic research. As discussed above, a 
large body of empirical literature is focused on the link between gender diversity and 
company performance.147 These studies have yet to use data on substantive diversity, 
such as the data presented in this Article. Combining this new data with the 
quantitative data analyzed in prior studies can better reveal gradations between 
female participation in the boardrooms and the impact on company performance. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. See supra Section I.C. 
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Third, the data on substantive diversity are full of nuance and are subject to 
interpretation. While some of the results may more clearly suggest a concern 
regarding gender parity, other findings are less clear-cut, and some of the findings 
provide a more optimistic depiction of substantive parity.  
Finally, it is important to underscore that the findings are limited to available data 
regarding director participation in the boardroom. The aforementioned variables are, 
of course, not an exhaustive list, and they do not reflect less observable data such as 
board dynamics and other measures of clout that are important factors for a more 
complete picture of the gender parity in each boardroom. 
Moving to some of the specific findings, several trends suggest a potential lack of 
substantive gender parity. First, the shorter tenure of women on boards should be of 
potential concern. Tenure has been recognized to play an important role in the 
influence that one possesses.148 Since longer tenured directors arguably carry more 
clout and influence in the board room,149 they might inhibit and restrain, intentionally 
or inadvertently, the ability and willingness of less tenured directors to act 
independently and might jeopardize the ability of the boardroom to foster an “open 
to all ideas” atmosphere.150 If there is a significant tenure disparity along gender 
lines, as the findings suggest, then women might face an uphill battle to have their 
voice heard in a boardroom controlled by long-tenured male directors.151 The fact 
that women are already a minority in the boardroom further magnifies the impact of 
tenure disparity. Studies have found that without a critical mass152 women encounter 
“social isolation . . . heightened visibility” and pressure to accept “stereotyped 
roles.”153 Tenure disparity may exacerbate these concerns, making women even less 
likely to overcome these obstacles.  
Importantly, the Article finds that director tenure is positively correlated with the 
likelihood of having a leadership role.154 If women systematically serve for shorter 
terms, then their opportunities to take these leadership roles is negatively affected. 
Clearly, the tenure disparity is concerning as it may influence the intraboard 
dynamics. It is also important to understand why women leave boards faster than 
men. Are they pushed out (explicitly or implicitly)? Do they suffer from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 125 (1997) 
(describing the impact tenure has on power, clout, and influence in the political sphere).  
 149. See Nili, supra note 52 (discussing the impact of director tenure on the board 
dynamics). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Of course, in some instances, long-tenured directors are less involved in the 
boardroom work, or newer directors exert more influence than their longer termed peers do. 
However, generally tenure correlates with greater clout.  
 152. Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 408–11 (discussing the issues with token directors 
and reviewing the studies finding that a critical mass is needed).  
 153. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, THE PROBLEMS OF TOKENISM 39–40 (1974) 
(monograph prepared for the Center for Research on Women in Higher Education and the 
Professions); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sarah White, Wanted: Female Corporate 
Directors, 29 PACE L. REV. 249, 257–64 (2009) (exploring behavior of token women directors 
on all-male boards).  
 154. The Article finds that leadership is positively correlated with a 1.51 years increase for 
males and a 0.62 years increase for females. Females in leadership roles have 1.96 fewer years 
of service than males (for nonleaders; females serve 2.85 fewer years among leaders). 
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overextension and overcommitment to board committees? Or do they have more 
options to choose from, resulting in more frequent moves between boards?  
Second, the underrepresentation of women in leadership roles, as chairwomen, as 
lead independent directors, or as committee chairs, is a potential signal regarding the 
level of substantive parity on the board. Women are less likely to hold leadership 
roles either as chair of the board/lead independent director or as chairs of the various 
board committees. These formal leadership roles carry significant formal powers. As 
chair, the director has control of the board or committee’s agenda in addition to other 
formal and informal powers. In addition, these formal leadership roles carry a 
symbolic value, signaling the importance and value of the director. The fact that 
women do not hold these leadership positions in equal numbers, even relative to their 
current low ratio on the board, is a potential indication that they have yet to climb 
sufficiently high on the board’s totem pole.  
Third, the data reflect that the pool of female directors serving on public boards 
is smaller than the pool of males and that women serve on more than one board in 
greater numbers. The data also show that women are also more likely to serve on 
more board committees on each board. The smaller pool of women directors may 
reflect entry barriers to joining a board. It may be the case that some women are not 
considered for board positions due to nomination metrics that may overemphasize 
requisite work experience, positions that men are currently holding in much greater 
numbers.155 At the same time, the data indicate that women might be taking on more 
board work compared to their fellow directors. While this can stem from an attempt 
to ensure diversity in the many board committees, it may also lead to women to being 
overworked. 
On the other side, the fact that women sit on multiple boards in greater numbers 
and the fact that they serve, on average, on more committees, can also be viewed in 
a positive light. Women enjoy greater exposure to the company (or different 
companies), which potentially allows them to enrich the board discussions and 
increase their clout within the board. 
The data reflect better parity between the genders, or at least movement in the 
right direction, in some of the other metrics examined as well. The ratio of women 
on boards is on the rise. There has also been a positive movement in the ratio of 
women as committee chairs, signaling an overall positive trend. Finally, women 
seem to gain access to all of the important board committees, albeit in lesser numbers 
on the key audit committee.  
In sum, the data exemplify the importance of a more detailed examination of the 
roles of women on boards. Women are clearly gaining ground in their representation 
on boards, but at the same time, significant disparities still exist between the genders 
regarding the roles and attributes of directors. 
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND ITS CURRENT FLAWS 
This Part reviews the current regulatory approach to gender diversity in 
boardrooms in the United States. In Section A, the Article describes the development 
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of the current disclosure regime in the United States. Section B provides novel data 
on the gender diversity disclosure practices of companies, against the backdrop of 
the current regulatory framework. Section C then brings the two previous Sections 
together, underscoring the flaws in the current regulatory approach. 
A. The Evolution of Diversity Disclosure Requirements 
The United States has taken a soft regulatory approach156 to the issue of gender 
diversity, requiring companies to disclose only whether they have a diversity policy 
in place,157 and to provide a description of the policy to investors.158 This approach 
stands in sharp contrast to the mandatory diversity quotas many European countries 
have recently adopted, requiring companies to maintain a specific ratio of women to 
men on the board.159  
Prior to 2009, boards in the United States were not required to make any 
disclosures regarding the nominating procedures related to diversity.160 In fact, Item 
407 at the time made no mention at all of diversity.161  
In its announcement of a 2009 amendment to Regulation S-K, the SEC noted it 
received numerous comments regarding the need for diversity disclosure within 
boards.162 Among the main advocates were two of the largest, and most socially 
active, pension funds: California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(“CalPERS”) and California State Teachers’ Retirement System (“CalSTRS”).163 
The announcement noted that many of these commenters desired disclosure of 
diversity to provide insight into corporate governance practices.164 This, in turn, 
would provide additional information during proxy season when determining 
whether to vote for or against board nominees.165  
In response to these communications, the SEC adopted Item 407(c) “requir[ing] 
disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating committee considers diversity in 
identifying nominees for director.”166 The regulation then requires that “if the 
nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with regard to the consideration of 
diversity in identifying director nominees, disclosure would be required of how this 
policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the board) 
assesses the effectiveness of its policy.”167 The regulation, however, does not define 
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68334, 68343 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 249, 274). 
 163. Id. at 68343 n.116. 
 164. Id. at 68344–45. 
 165. Id. at 68334. 
 166. Id. at 68343. 
 167. Id. at 68343–44. 
184 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:145 
 
the term “diversity,” and it left it to companies to define what they mean by diversity 
in their policies and disclosures.168 
B. Current Company Disclosures  
The regulatory framework, laid out in Section A, leaves a broad spectrum of 
parameters that constitute compliance with the SEC’s diversity disclosure 
requirements, including making no diversity disclosure at all. Not surprisingly, 
companies vary in their board diversity disclosure practices.169 Some companies 
provide detailed information to investors regarding their diversity policies.170 Other 
companies merely recite the words necessary to comply with Item 407(c)(vi) and no 
more.171  
This Section explores director diversity disclosures in practice. To do so, using a 
hand-collected data set, the disclosure statements of one hundred public companies 
for the years of 2008, 2012, and 2016 were analyzed.172 To account for both large, 
high profile, companies as well as smaller, less visible public companies, fifty of the 
companies make up the Fortune 50 and the remaining fifty are Fortune 2000 small-
cap companies. Some companies did not have proxy statements available in all of 
the three examined years, bringing the sample to ninety-four companies in 2008 and 
ninety-eight companies in 2012 and 2016, respectively. 
As Figure 7 below shows, in 2008, only fifty-five of ninety-four companies 
disclosed that they considered diversity, in a general sense, at all. In 2012 and 2016, 
following the amendment to Regulation S-K,173 those numbers increased to ninety-
three and ninety-five companies, respectively. However, corporations’ consideration 
of diversity did not necessarily specifically include gender as part of the criteria for 
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 170. See, e.g., Conn. Water Serv. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30, 
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Six Flags Entm’t Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 22, 2016); Skechers U.S.A., 
Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2016). 
 172. The data was derived manually from a sample of 100 companies. This sample contains 
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The complete data file is on file with the author. 
 173. See supra Section III.A. 
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creating a more diverse board. In 2008, for instance, only five corporations 
specifically disclosed in their proxy statements that they consider gender as criteria 
for selecting director nominees. Although this number significantly increased to 
forty-two in 2012 and fifty-three in 2016, still only barely a majority of corporations 
indicated that they specifically considered gender when selecting director nominees.  
Figure 7: Trends in Gender Diversity Disclosure 
 
 
Importantly, many of the companies that do not have a formal policy in place have 
noted that while they lack a formal diversity policy, they consider the diversity of 
perspectives, experiences, and backgrounds of director nominees when slating a new 
board. For example, Quanex (NYSE: NX) uses the language, “[a]lthough the 
company has no formal policy on diversity for board members, the board considers 
diversity of experience and background in an effort to ensure that the composition of 
our directors creates a strong and effective board.”174 While such language is 
compliant with the SEC rule, it illustrates the vagueness that companies can use when 
addressing diversity.175  
Quanex is not an outlier. Only six out of the 100 companies reviewed currently 
have a definition of diversity laid out in their disclosures. Thus, even though 
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corporations may have diversity policies, and at times they may explicitly seek 
gender diversity, an overwhelming majority of such policies lack the desired clarity 
and focus, instead crafted in a manner that dilutes any specific diversity criteria. 
Concerns regarding the ability of current disclosure to truly promote gender 
diversity can be illustrated through the case of Emcor (NYSE: EME). In 2008, not 
unlike many of the other corporations in the study, Emcor had no reference to 
diversity in its disclosure, nor any women on its board.176 All eight directors on 
Emcor’s board were men.177 More striking, however, was that both in 2012 and 2016 
Emcor disclosed under the SEC requirements that it considers diversity in its 
nomination process but indicated that its focus is on obtaining a diversity of 
professional expertise rather than a diversity of personal characteristics.178 Not 
surprisingly, Emcor failed to add any women to the board even while increasing the 
total board size to ten directors.179  
On the other hand, there are examples of companies that have made meaningful 
changes to their nomination process as well as to their boardroom diversity disclosure 
practices. One such example is Children’s Place (NSDQ: PLCE). Although female 
directors in 2008 and 2012 only composed thirteen percent of Children’s Place’s 
board,180 the percentage of the board held by female directors jumped to thirty-six 
percent in 2016.181 These increases correlated with substantive changes in the 
corporation’s policy towards board refreshment and diversity. In 2010, after the SEC 
regulation took effect, Children’s Place added a consideration of gender as criteria 
when nominating directors.182 The company continued to improve its diversity 
policies and, in 2016, provided a clear graphic to investors detailing the gender 
composition of its board of directors.183 Further, Children’s Place specifically stated 
that it seeks a board that has “an appropriate balance in terms of gender. Four of our 
Board members are women.”184 This combination of clear visual information with 
an explicit and measurable policy provides a blueprint for effective and tangible 
gender diversity policies and disclosure practices. 
More broadly, SEC disclosures reflect company policies that may be leading to 
concrete outcomes when it comes to a company’s gender diversity. Indeed, the 
connection between what a company discloses to investors and its gender diversity 
ratio is not merely anecdotal. Examining the correlation between company 
disclosures and the ratio of women on the board, this Article found a statistically 
significant positive correlation. Specifically, as Table 13 below illustrates, 
companies that specifically addressed gender in their diversity disclosure were also 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Emcor Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 28, 2008). 
 177. See id. 
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 184. Id. at 9. 
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more likely to have higher ratio of females on their board,185 compared to companies 
without a diversity policy or one that solely refers to difference in viewpoints.  
Table 13: Regression Results 
Type of Disclosure Year 
Percentage of Female 
Directors  
(correlation coefficient 
(p-value)) 
Consider diversity at all  2008 0.213 (0.038) 
Consider diversity at all  2012 -0.070 (0.489) 
Consider diversity at all  2016 -0.031 (0.756) 
Use gender as a factor in their decision-making  2008 0.043 (0.677) 
Use gender as a factor in their decision-making  2012 0.286 (0.004) 
Use gender as a factor in their decision-making  2016 0.352 (0.0003) 
Define diversity to include diverse 
perspectives/viewpoints  
2008 0.230 (0.025) 
Define diversity to include diverse 
perspectives/viewpoints  
2012 -0.05596334 (0.5842) 
Define diversity to include diverse 
perspectives/viewpoints  
2016 0.05038617 (0.6222) 
 
In sum, although the current state of diversity disclosures is reflective of the “soft” 
regulatory approach, it also exemplifies the value of meaningful disclosure to 
investors and the potential that a potent disclosure regime can provide. 
C. The Flaws with Current Disclosures 
The current regulatory approach, if truly intended to promote better gender 
diversity disclosure, suffers from several flaws.186 First, as others have noted, under 
the current rules diversity is an open-ended concept.187 Boards can include anything 
from gender and race to age and life experiences in defining diversity.188 In turn, 
many companies comply with the letter of the regulation by defining diversity 
broadly enough to incorporate any possible difference between people.189  
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Note that while the study found a correlation, it does not assert that there is a 
causation. In other words, companies may be willing to disclose that they consider gender 
because they have more women on the board.  
 186. The current regulatory approach has been criticized by several academics along 
similar lines. See, e.g., DHIR, supra note 20, at 71–94; Fairfax, Same Old Story, supra note 88, 
at 874–75; Rhode & Packel, supra note 82, at 419. 
 187. See supra note 186. 
 188. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 162, at 68343–44. 
 189. See, e.g., Discovery Comm., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 30, 2016); 
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Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 29, 2016); UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., Proxy 
188 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:145 
 
Second, one of the major flaws of Regulation S-K noted by critics of the SEC 
approach is that it only applies to boards who have diversity policies in place but 
does not affirmatively require anything on behalf of boards without such policies.190 
It has been suggested that one unintended consequence of this lack of an affirmative 
policy is to disincentivize companies from creating a diversity policy.191 A company 
that creates a diversity policy must not only explain how the policy is enacted and its 
results but also must describe how the policy works in practice.192 While some may 
argue that investors would nonetheless pressure companies into creating a policy, 
until recently that has not been the case. Instead of increasing disclosure and 
transparency, Regulation S-K has ironically restricted a company’s incentive to draft 
diversity policies and increase the gender diversity of its board. 
Third, beyond these effectively voluntary disclosures, the SEC requires no 
additional information with respect to boardroom gender diversity.193 This seems 
inconsistent with the intention of Item 407(c) as explicitly stated by the SEC.194 
Investors expressed desire for information regarding diversity,195 yet a company can 
easily obscure its views on diversity. Thus, the requirements under Regulation S-K 
and the information provided by companies fail to adequately disclose the desired 
information. 
When amending Regulation S-K in 2009, the SEC could have also included 
requirements for diversity in Item 407(c)(2)(v), which requires the company to: 
Describe any specific minimum qualifications that the nominating 
committee believes must be met by a nominating committee-
recommended nominee for a position on the registrant’s board of 
directors, and describe any specific qualities or skills that the nominating 
committee believes are necessary for one or more of the registrant’s 
directors to possess.196 
However, not only did the SEC not add diversity to Item 407(c)(2)(v), but the 
SEC also explicitly excluded this Section from the diversity requirement197 and, in 
fact, included the diversity requirement directly after this Section.198 By specifically 
stating that the above requirement did not apply to diversity, companies without 
strong diversity policies have lacked an incentive to create one. 
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In 2016, then SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White described the role of the SEC in 
gender diversity,199 within the traditional focus of the SEC on disclosure,200 stating 
that “boards with diverse members function better and are correlated with better 
company performance[, which] is precisely why investors have—and should have—
an interest in diversity disclosure about board members and nominees.”201 However, 
as she has noted202 and as this Article demonstrates,203 company policies remain 
vague. Further, very few companies have produced formal diversity policies, making 
it hard to evaluate the effectiveness of diversity policies.204 While Chairwoman 
White noted that the SEC had researched and prepared a recommendation to require 
companies to include in their proxy statements more meaningful board diversity 
disclosures on their board members and nominees,205 no rule was ever formally 
announced and the often-criticized Item 407(c)(2)(vi) remains investors’ only 
regulatory means of ascertaining diversity information in the boardroom. 
This regulatory failure has led investors such as State Street and BlackRock to 
create comply-or-explain policies regarding gender diversity on the board, which are 
tied to their votes for board elections.206 In essence, these investors have effectively 
initiated a gender diversity “threshold” for companies to meet in order to avoid 
investor backlash.207 With the threat of upsetting these investors and opening the 
gates for activist shareholders to court these votes, companies are likely to meet the 
minimum requirements to comply with State Street and BlackRock’s demands. 
* * * * 
The SEC’s amendment in 2009 was a move in the right direction. At a minimum, 
it provided some information to investors regarding public companies’ diversity 
policies and—as the data in Section B shows—it has clearly increased the number of 
companies that disclosed their diversity policies. It may have also influenced some 
companies to create diversity policies, which were previously absent, and it has 
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directed attention to the issue of gender diversity. However, the flaws in the current 
framework provide clear areas for potential reform that could make company 
disclosures even more effective and valuable. In the next Part, the Article discusses 
these potential reforms as part of a broader discussion of the policy implications 
stemming from the Article’s findings regarding substantive gender diversity.  
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In Part II, the Article presented data on the composition and roles female directors 
hold on S&P 1500 boards. The data show that differences between genders are 
reflected not only in the ratio of women to men but also in their roles once elected to 
the board. Furthermore, as with all averages, some companies perform better or 
worse than average in gender parity—potentially leading to cases where the 
quantitative parity of the board is not indicative of the substantive parity.  
In other words, a company may have a higher than average number of women on 
the board but may relegate them to less important positions on the board while 
another company may have a lower number of women who are in key leadership 
positions on the board. While this might seem an unlikely scenario, similar issues 
exist in countries with mandated quotas.208 
 Furthermore, the composition of a company’s board is fluid. In any given year, a 
company may lose or add a female director, therefore temporarily changing its 
gender ratio. It does not mean, however, that such company changed (for better or 
for worse) the level of substantive parity in its boardroom. These findings 
demonstrate that substantive diversity is important, and that attention needs to be 
paid to the differences in substantive diversity between men and women on boards. 
Part III then examined the current SEC disclosure regime with respect to gender 
diversity on boards. The Article demonstrated that companies provide very little 
diversity information to their investors and discussed the current flaws in the 
disclosure regime. 
This Part aims to bring together these two strands—the importance of substantive 
gender diversity and the deficiencies in the current disclosure regime—by discussing 
the policy implications of these findings. First, regulators, investors, and companies 
themselves should direct their attention to the question of substantive gender 
diversity. If women bring value to boardrooms as companies and investors alike 
believe, then ensuring that they are able to contribute equally must become an 
integral part of the existing discourse. Second, the Article discusses the regulatory 
implications and suggests a shift towards an enhanced disclosure regime that would 
require companies to provide investors with both substantive and quantitative 
measures of gender diversity with respect to the boardroom.  
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A. A Focus on Substantive Diversity 
Prior studies, investor demands, and policy arguments have focused on 
quantitative measures or a diversity threshold.209 That is, existing literature has 
recommended that companies either meet some gender diversity threshold, disclose 
their plans to reach some set number of female directors, or explain their failure to 
do so.210 Though an increase in the absolute number of women on boards is clearly 
important, and does provide more “diversity,” the findings in Part II illustrate the 
need to augment this information with data on the specific roles that women perform 
on any given board.  
Granted, the appeal of the quantitative approach is understandable. Quantitative 
measurements of diversity can provide a bird’s eye view of boardroom diversity. 
They are easier to analyze and monitor. They are less murky or subject to 
interpretation. Their strength is in their simplicity and straightforwardness. The focus 
on increasing the ratio of women on boards also has undeniable benefits. Female 
directors provide a new or different perspective on board decisions.211 These 
additional viewpoints provide a better opportunity for thoughtful business 
decisions.212 A higher number of female directors could also help improve the 
general gender diversity in the company.213 The more women on the board, the more 
likely that the company promotes gender diversity from within.214 
However, a sole focus on quantitative measurements misses the mark in assessing 
and promoting true corporate board diversity. Corporations required to meet 
quantitative diversity metrics can focus on achieving that metric without changing 
the board’s culture or the board’s nomination procedures.215 That is, a nominating 
committee whose continued directorship is dependent on nominating an additional 
woman (due to the threat of withhold campaigns by investors) will do just that. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the company will enact a policy to 
include more women in their future searches or afford women, directly and 
indirectly, with equal power within the boardroom or attempt to increase diversity 
throughout the corporation. 
Substantive measurements add color to the monochrome image that the number 
and ratio of women provides us. They move away from solely asking companies to 
meet a specific number of positions to be filled by gender diverse candidates. Instead, 
it also allows for fluidity among companies to focus on the diversity aspects within 
the boardroom work it, or its investors, finds important.  
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Importantly, the inclusion of substantive measures does not take away from the 
ability, and need, of boards to increase the number of women or diverse directors on 
the board. Rather, it incentivizes these companies to increase gender diversity 
quantitatively while also ensuring that ample attention is given to the substantive 
gender parity within the boardroom. Because the absolute number of diverse 
candidates on the board will still likely be dispositive towards any measure of 
diversity, a company will still be incentivized to increase the number of women on 
the board. However, it provides well-intentioned companies the opportunity to 
organically grow their gender diversity.216  
Indeed, the data highlights the ties between these metrics. For example, women 
are more likely to stay on the board for longer if the ratio of women on the board is 
higher. Similarly, the presence of female directors in leadership roles is positively 
correlated to longer tenure of the rest of the female directors on the same board.  
As a result, investors should expect companies to do more than just add an 
additional female to the board. For example, if the tenure of women is correlated 
with their likelihood to take on leadership roles, as this Article finds, then investors 
must scrutinize companies in which women’s tenure is low. Similarly, if the presence 
of a woman in a leadership role can influence the willingness of women to stay 
longer, then investors must account for that in their valuation of the company’s 
gender diversity. If the fact that women are stretched too thin prevents them from 
taking on leadership roles, then investors should consider asking companies to limit 
the committee work that each director can do.  
Companies themselves must also take a proactive approach. Companies must 
examine their corporate culture and make sure that women are not stretched too thin 
in their committee work, which could keep them from taking more active leadership 
roles. Companies may also want to consider term limits for leadership roles, allowing 
more women on the board to get an opportunity to serve in these roles. Companies 
should also promote structured and clear opportunities for women to move up into 
leadership roles, including mentorship.217  
Public attention and regulatory emphasis should also take account of the 
substantive measures of board diversity. A focus on substantive measures of board 
diversity in addition to quantitative data on companies’ current and historic gender 
diversity ratios would accomplish the core of gender diversity initiatives by asking a 
simple, yet underaddressed, question: How do corporate policies and corporate 
governance truly advance gender diversity?  
B. Regulatory Reform  
What regulatory intervention, if any, should be advocated for implementation in 
the United States?218 Different jurisdictions around the world have approached the 
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issue in diverse ways.219 First, some countries have placed hard quotas on board 
composition, requiring either progressive representation by board size or simply 
requiring some minimum number of female directors.220 Second, some countries 
have adopted softer laws otherwise known as comply-or-explain provisions.221 These 
laws require boards to either meet a specific quota or state the affirmative reasons for 
failing to comply with the law.222 Third, some countries (including the United States) 
have placed minimal to no regulations regarding gender diversity.223 As expected, 
the fewer or softer the regulations, the lower the female board participation rate.224 
Though, generally speaking, tougher regulations lead to better female board 
participation, other factors, including societal views towards gender, have a 
significant impact on women’s board participation.225 Sweden, for example, has no 
required quota for board participation, yet still has some of the highest parity between 
the genders on boards.226 On the other hand, a country like India has a hard law 
requiring at least one female on every board.227 However, in complying with the 
regulation, 83.5% of Indian corporations have only one female on the board.228 
Further, only 59% of boards have an independent female director.229 Though both 
show extreme examples of the spectrum, these countries prove the difficulty in 
addressing board gender parity. Thus, gender diversity activists disagree as to 
whether a quota enacts the meaningful change sought.  
As a practical matter, quotas are an unlikely regulatory avenue in the United 
States, as they would face legal hurdles230 and are unlikely to garner investor or 
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regulatory support.231 Scholars point to Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, in which the Supreme Court specifically rejected quotas in affirmative action 
policies,232 as a likely legal hurdle to potential gender quota regulation in the United 
States.233 Equally important, many of the changes in countries outside the United 
States that have implemented quotas arose due to public pressure.234 However, even 
adamant supporters of affirmative action policies in the United States strongly 
disfavor mandatory quotas as a means for remediation,235 further undermining a 
focus on quotas as a remedy to the lack of gender diversity on the board. 
Indeed, the SEC has mostly opted to use disclosure as a mean to address issues 
related to corporate governance and social cause.236 It is not surprising then, that in 
the context of gender diversity in boardrooms, company disclosure has been the 
natural first step of many regulatory reform proposals.237 Moreover, even if gender 
quotas were on the regulatory table, it is not clear that they would produce sufficient 
focus on substantive diversity, as quotas are merely an enhanced version of the 
existing quantitative focus.  
The flaws in the current disclosure regime are therefore the logical starting point 
of any regulatory reform. Recognizing the incongruity between the intention and 
implementation of the regulation, the SEC under former Chairman Mary Jo White 
made boardroom diversity a priority,238 and House Representatives have recently 
urged the incoming SEC Chair to amend the diversity disclosure regime.239 This 
recent momentum could make a reconsideration of the current rules more likely, 
although the current political landscape may present challenges to such reform.  
Yet, the current calls for regulatory reform by investors and legislators are focused 
on the addition of quantitative disclosure regarding the gender/race of directors.240 
While an important step in itself, the findings presented in this Article highlight that 
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a review of the current standards must also consider substantive diversity 
measurements. Therefore, if disclosure of gender diversity of boards is needed, as 
investors and regulators alike have indicated, then a more complete overhaul of the 
current diversity disclosure regime is warranted. 
The findings in Section III.C also underscore the potential intrinsic value of 
gender diversity disclosure. These findings suggest that the SEC’s disclosure regime, 
if properly modified to address its current deficiencies, could be an appropriate 
avenue for addressing diversity issues on boards, including incorporating the concept 
of substantive diversity.  
Consequently, the current calls for a disclosure reform should address two distinct 
issues. First, the SEC must address the current definition of diversity to prevent 
companies from strategically diluting it. Second, any added disclosure requirements 
should include both quantitative and substantive measures of diversity.  
1. The Definition of Diversity 
Current SEC disclosure rules focus on whether and how a company considers 
diversity. As developed above, the current legal framework fails to ensure even this 
modest task. As discussed in Section III.C, one of the biggest flaws in diversity 
disclosures is the ability of boards to self-define diversity.241 A company can define 
diversity broadly so long as that definition is provided to investors.242 Unfortunately, 
this provides companies with the opportunity to include any and all potentially 
diverse characteristics, therefore diluting the specific interest in gender diversity. For 
example, companies may include “differences of viewpoint” as a measure of 
diversity.243 If a company defines itself as diverse merely because it has “difference 
of viewpoints,” then how is an investor expected to evaluate that board?  
Permitting companies to define diversity allows the company to include all of the 
aspects of diversity the company values. However, any regulation should still include 
a specific set of gender diversity measures,244 for which each company must provide 
data, in order to promote homogeneity amongst corporate diversity disclosures. By 
requiring companies to define diversity clearly using a prerequisite list of clear and 
measurable diversity factors,245 investors can consciously vote for or against boards 
meeting their expectation of diversity.  
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2. Adding a Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure  
The deficiencies in the current disclosure regime extend beyond the open-ended 
treatment of diversity or the lack of effective disclosure by companies regarding their 
approach to gender diversity on the board. Investors are also left in the dark regarding 
the actual diversity in the boardroom. Recognizing the value in accounting for both 
quantitative and substantive measures, this Article calls for the adoption of a 
“Substantive Gender Diversity Disclosure” (SGDD) that would be required of each 
company. The SGDD would require the company to provide a clear table, similar to 
other disclosures such as director and executive compensation that summarizes many 
of the measures highlighted above. The data should include the current ratio of 
women to men on the board, the specific roles of women on the board compared to 
men (with a specific breakdown of leadership positions), a comparative breakdown 
of age and tenure, and any additional specific insight into how its board and its 
corporate structure promote diversity.  
Currently, most diversity statements included in proxy forms are drafted in 
narrative form and remain vague, simply stating all diversity factors that are 
potentially relevant into nominating directors.246 Diversity disclosures should, in 
addition to the definition of diversity, clearly state how diverse a company is by using 
both measurable metrics (quantitative and substantive) and company policies 
promoting diversity within the boardroom and the company. The SGDD, as a 
concept, is meant to carry this function. 
Indeed, requiring companies to provide substantive disclosures of board diversity, 
in addition to quantitative data on their current and historic gender diversity ratios, 
would accomplish the core of gender diversity initiatives: Do we truly achieve gender 
diversity? 
An SEC amendment to its diversity rules that would potentially include the 
suggested SGDD table carries several benefits. First, it would enable the adoption of 
a unified SGDD that would allow shareholders to easily compare companies and 
ensure that all companies are playing on the same playing field. It would also ensure 
that changes to diversity on boards would occur more rapidly, as current shareholder 
initiatives are only slowly beginning to gain steam. Finally, SEC led change will also 
carry with it better enforcement of the new rules. Such institutional enforcement 
would be lacking through other channels.  
While the specific design of the SGDD should be crafted after a detailed 
regulatory rule-making process, it is important to underscore that the SEC could 
create a semi-flexible SGDD. By requiring disclosure regarding certain issues, but 
allowing companies to experiment with policies, measurements, and other disclosed 
metrics, this flexibility will allow for some organic growth and improvement.  
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C. Implementation Through Other Means 
While a change to the current SEC rules would be the most straightforward route 
for addressing gender diversity disclosure, the current SEC, under the new chair, may 
be unwilling to take any regulatory steps in the near future. Therefore, companies 
could hypothetically adopt a SGDD, or similar initiatives, on their own through two 
other means. First, companies may voluntarily adopt improved disclosures based on 
the mounting pressure from large investor groups. Second, SGDD could be 
advocated via the shareholder proposal mechanism. While both are plausible 
avenues, each suffers from drawbacks that would make them less effective than a 
regulatory reform route. 
1. Organic Growth 
This Article began by showing the drastic change over the first few months of 
2017 with regard to the view of diversity within the boardroom.247 State Street and 
BlackRock have specifically drawn a line in the sand regarding gender diversity: 
promote more women or risk being voted out.248 The impact will likely soon be felt 
as companies actively look to add women onto the board to avoid an inevitable 
negative vote. The benefits of this route are clear. Companies will organically move 
towards more gender diversity with minimum regulatory burdens and without rapid 
shocks. 
However, while this strategy will likely continue to increase the number of 
women in board directorships, it is not clear that it would lead to better company 
disclosures. Investors (and very recently Congress) have been advocating for 
improved quantitative disclosure for several years, with no success.249 
2. Shareholder Proposals 
Recent years have brought to the forefront the shareholder proposal250 as an 
effective tool for corporate governance changes.251 The increasing importance of 
proxy advisers coupled with the credible threat of “withhold” campaigns against 
companies that ignore shareholder concerns have led corporations to pay closer 
attention to precatory (nonbinding) shareholder proposals that receive significant 
support by shareholders. The guidelines of ISS and Glass Lewis, the two largest and 
most influential proxy advisory firms, require companies to act upon shareholder 
resolutions that pass.252 If management ignores successful shareholder proposals, 
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proxy advisory firms are likely to recommend against votes on individual directors 
(or the entire board), and such directors could be subject to potential withhold 
campaigns. In essence, such practice has transferred the so-called “precatory” 
shareholder proposals into “quasi-binding” resolutions. This suggests that companies 
nowadays face more severe sanctions if an unwelcomed shareholder proposal 
passes.253  
Indeed, the ability of shareholders to discipline board members through 
withholding votes from directors’ nominees has become a major way for passive 
shareholders to express their voice within the current regulatory framework and to 
signal to the board that they are dissatisfied with its actions. In light of this new 
reality, some companies prefer to negotiate and work with the proposing shareholder 
to enact some change without having it go to a shareholder vote.254 If the shareholder 
is successful with either method, then the company will likely change its corporate 
governance to avoid future negative votes for failing to enact the proposal. 
In the area of diversity disclosure, shareholders can submit proposals that are 
individualized to each company or, more than likely, in the form of a standard 
proposal. Shifting the aim of the shareholder-initiated proposals from the gender 
ratios or quantitative disclosure to substantive disclosure carries an additional 
benefit. It is a more modest request from the company and one that falls within the 
core rights of shareholders. By merely requiring the company to provide meaningful 
backward-looking information on diversity, the company is not necessarily required 
to change anything other than providing an additional disclosure. It is likely that 
requiring the disclosure will produce these changes as companies attempt to appease 
shareholders through their disclosures. However, these changes do not directly arise 
from the shareholder proposal but rather are indirect effects of transparency. 
 Not only will the less stringent requirements of the disclosure offer a better 
opportunity for adoption, but the support of passive investors will also make these 
proposals more likely to pass. With CalPERS and CalSTRS highly invested in many 
passive funds,255 their support for gender diversity will flow through to the voters of 
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these passive funds. Thus, a shareholder proposal supporting gender diversity is 
likely to be viewed and voted positively by these funds. In turn, companies will likely 
be more inclined to adopt shareholder proposals before shareholder vote knowing 
the likelihood of passive fund support is high.  
However, shareholders have yet to focus on the substantive aspect of diversity, 
opting to focus on the more tangible quantitative issue. Indeed, while shareholders 
are currently submitting proposals for gender diversity initiatives,256 most of these 
proposals suggest a company establish practices for identifying and adding female 
board directors.257 However, the focus in these proposals is still more in the 
nomination process rather than the roles directors take within the board.258 
Moreover, the shareholder proposal route has yet to garner sufficient support. 
Gender diversity proposals have struggled to attain the requisite votes to put the 
proposal into action,259 partially since some of the largest shareholders of companies 
routinely withhold votes on social issues, as they prefer to engage directly with the 
company.260 In 2016, only one in nine of such proposals received the votes necessary 
to pass.261 However, these numbers do not account for submitted proposals that were 
settled prior to vote.262 It is possible that some of these proposals were negotiated on 
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or completely enacted by the company before the shareholder vote and therefore 
never had an opportunity to be voted on.  
D. Potential Objections  
This Section considers and responds to several possible objections to the proposed 
disclosure reforms and the focus on substantive disclosure. 
1. “Substantive Murkiness”  
On its face, substantive diversity disclosures will make it more difficult for 
investors to determine whether a company has sufficiently increased its diversity. 
Quantitative measures are simple. A company reaches a predefined percentage 
threshold or some absolute number and is consequently determined to be sufficiently 
diverse. Therefore, the murkiness that a focus on a substantive disclosure may create 
might detract from such efforts.  
However, this argument misses the mark on several fronts. First, as discussed 
above, the design of the substantive disclosure can establish easy, quantifiable 
parameters such as tenure, lead roles, committee chairs, and more. These quantifiable 
measures would allow for more clarity into the substantive parity in the boardroom, 
while also providing clear benchmarks of comparison. Second, the substantive 
disclosures are not mutually exclusive with the general push for more diversity in the 
board nomination process. To the contrary, the suggested SGDD would include the 
quantitative data. The addition of the substantive data may incentivize companies to 
take additional substantial steps to prove they have met the requisite diversity.  
2. Overinclusiveness 
Some critics may argue that current disclosure requirements are sufficient and that 
any additional disclosures would lead to overinclusiveness and to overloading 
investors with information. Further, to counter the possible concerns of investors, 
companies may provide information that is clearly immaterial, placing unnecessary 
costs on the company and for investors who would need to comb through this 
information. 
However, this argument is also lacking in several aspects. First, forcing the board 
to be overinclusive and shining light on substantive diversity disclosure allows for a 
better assessment of the board’s substantive diversity. Second, shareholders are more 
than capable of properly digesting this information with the help of sophisticated 
investors and proxy advisers. Third, the general trend in current corporate 
governance is for more information rather than less.263 There is no reason to deviate 
from this approach when it comes to diversity.  
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3. Questionable Diversity Practices Will Persist 
A third potential objection is that changing disclosure requirements will not cure 
the problem of substantive parity in the boardroom. Companies may react by better 
camouflaging their board practices, and some investors will look differently at 
different substantive markers, placing different “diversity scores” for each company.  
However, the proposed changes are designed to increase investor transparency 
rather than force substantive parity on companies. A focus on substantive factors in 
addition to the quantitative ratios would better educate investors of their company’s 
board’s true diversity. In turn, better investor awareness to both quantitative and 
substantive aspects of diversity might allow each company to strike its own optimal 
diversity balance, both in terms of quantity and roles that women take on the board.  
4. Private Ordering 
If substantive disclosure is important, and value enhancing, then supporters of the 
market view could ask why we do not see companies adopt it without regulatory 
intervention. There are several reasons, however, to be skeptical of reliance on the 
market alone to drive these changes. First, companies lack the incentive to provide 
this information to shareholders, as it may reveal the true diversity gap on the board, 
even where the number of women directors is relatively high. Second, while 
shareholders could value the substantive aspect of diversity, focusing on the 
quantitative aspect has seemed to be the focus of their initiatives. As explained above, 
some of it is a strategic focus on more observable issues, but this Article contends 
that some of it is also due to the lack of current attention to the roles women take in 
the boardroom after being elected. Finally, market movement is already happening, 
but it is inherently slow. The Article highlighted two “private ordering” avenues 
through which we may see a move towards substantive diversity disclosure. 
However, the Article also highlighted the benefits that a centralized regulatory 
intervention may provide, one that the market is unlikely to produce.  
CONCLUSION 
The current SEC regulatory framework fails to adequately disclose to investors 
the substantive representation of female directors on the board or even provide the 
ratio of women on the board. While previous studies have introduced evidence that 
social and economic reasons exist for increasing gender diversity, many companies 
have lagged behind in introducing policies aimed at searching for and cultivating 
gender diversity. The key argument developed in this Article is that while a focus on 
the number of women on boards is important and a central first step in the quest for 
true gender parity, it cannot be the only lens through which gender diversity is 
examined. Rather, investors and boards should also focus on a substantive disclosure 
of female boardroom participation. 
Substantive disclosures complement the quantitative data in that they provide a 
more nuanced account of the substantive diversity in the boardroom, while also 
providing companies with the ability and flexibility to draft policies and propose 
corporate changes applicable to their situation. Rather than encouraging companies 
to meet some specific gender diversity metric, companies will be incentivized to 
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delve deeper into gender diversity and disclose their method for doing so. This 
provides investors with the possibility of meaningful change they seek and improves 
transparency into the corporate governance procedures of leading companies. 
Coupled with prior studies indicating positive correlations between gender diversity 
and company performance, increased disclosure could provide positive benefits to 
corporate America and society at large. 
Equally important, recognizing the import of substantive gender diversity 
necessitates further research into the intraboard dynamics. This Article has used 
available data to examine several disparities between the genders. However, our 
understanding of substantive diversity would greatly benefit from additional data 
points on the respective roles that the genders take in the boardroom. 
The recent focus on board gender equity has started to move the needle, but gender 
equity is still sorely missing from most public companies in the United States. The 
substantive and leadership gaps between the genders on public companies’ boards 
must shift gender diversity advocates away from a micro-focus on numbers. The past 
year proved that change is possible. Now, investors and regulators must turn their 
attention beyond the numbers to the systematic disparities between women and men 
on boards. If women are not moving into positions of power on boards or are 
otherwise treated differently on boards, we need to know why, and we need to 
understand the cost. 
